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In a world in which data is being generated in increasing large volumes and is easily 
accessible to multiple users in a cloud environment, there is a need to maintain situational 
awareness and information assurance of the data, ensuring the data is being monitored for 
vulnerabilities. This is especially crucial for military operations where the information 
being used to support the mission is confidential and readily available throughout the 
mission. It is essential to maintain the integrity of that information. The need is even 
more critical when data is being used to help save lives in natural disaster situations.  
A trio system concept within an enterprise/cloud network is developed in this 
research to provide situational awareness and command and control abilities to users, for 
detecting possible cyber attacks on network and computing resources, and maintaining 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical data within the network. 
A systems engineering approach was used to develop and propose the solution to 
ensure information assurance and cyber situational awareness within a smart cloud of 
system of systems. This thesis provides system diagrams of the proposed architecture 
focusing on one of the systems using IDEF0 diagrams, and a feature matrix to 
demonstrate the concept of Detect, Identify, Predict, and React model. A proof-of-
concept experiment for the Identify model is discussed. 
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A new realm of threat has emerged with the dawn of cyber warfare; data is being 
generated in increasingly huge amounts, making the management and monitoring of data 
difficult. Cyber attack methodology has also become more sophisticated. Ensuring data 
has not been compromised and maintaining its confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
is crucial for military operations, especially when data is being used to save lives in 
humanitarian assistance and natural disaster relief operations. This thesis proposes a 
system of systems engineering methodology for integrating and configuring an 
intelligence automation system for the purpose of enabling cyber command and control 
and cyber situational awareness. 
A trio of intelligence automation systems, namely Cyber Situation Awareness and 
Command and Control (CSAC2), Cyber Attack Detection Situation Awareness 
(CADSA), and Information Assurance Situation Awareness (IASA), was proposed to 
achieve the purpose of providing automated information assurance for cyber situation 
awareness of data, including the assurance of data confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability. A proof of concept using the Identify software of the Detect, Identify, 
Predict, and React (DIPR) model of the IASA system was used to automate the 
information assurance of a target file, which is in the data at rest state, against four test 
cases. The four test cases are normal operation, loss of confidentiality, loss of integrity 
and loss of availability of a monitored target of interest. The proof of concept 
successfully analyzed and updated the feature matrix produced by the Detect software of 
DIPR model for each of the four test scenarios. Further research can be done to improve 
the usage of other file characteristics, such as monitoring candidates, studying the 
effectiveness of monitoring data in other data states, and expanding experimental testing 
by integrating CSAC2 and CADSA into the test.  
A systems engineering approach was used to explore the possible solution to the 
problem statement focusing mainly on the IASA system. A systematic analysis of the 
requirements to automate information assurance in the areas of data confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability for cyber situational awareness within a smart cloud system of 
 xviii 
systems was performed. After going through the systems engineering process and 
generating an architecture with an analysis of alternatives, this thesis implements and 
describes an instantiated proof-of-concept system of a portion of the IASA system, with 
documented test and evaluation results. 
Making use of the Detect, Identify, Predict, and React (DIPR) model, the IASA 
system is able to perform the task of ensuring information assurance by monitoring, 
analyzing, and comparing the file characteristics, such as the timestamp and file size of 
the monitored target. This thesis focused on data in the state of at rest/stored, but the 
concept can be expanded to other data states such as in transit or in use by applying 
different types of cyber sensors. The concept can be further expanded with the 
implementation of CSAC2 and CADSA systems in the network, thereby providing 
synergy between the applications and producing a robust setup. This trio system of 
systems will automate generation of alerts to operators and activate cyber controls to 
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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
As an introduction to this thesis, this chapter first explains the reason for selecting 
this thesis topic, which is derived from both a project on Smart Cloud System of Systems 
and direct discussions of the cybersecurity issues on Smart Cloud System of Systems 
with Vice Admiral (VADM) Jan Tighe, currently Commander of 10th Fleet Cyber 
Command. This chapter then reviews additional stakeholder input for selecting the 
operational scenario for this thesis application. This chapter then presents the resulting 
proposed concept of the thesis and the capability gap that the concept fills. Finally, this 
chapter concludes with a high-level overview of the thesis organization. 
A. SMART CLOUD SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS 
As part of the Systems Engineering curriculum at Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS), a project-based, three-course sequence is required that covers Engineering 
Systems Conceptualization, Engineering Systems Design, and Engineering Systems 
Implementation & Operation (Goshorn 2013). There were several projects to choose 
from, and the author chose to work with the Smart Cloud System of Systems (SoS) with 
Dr. Deborah Goshorn. This is based on over fifteen years of research on intelligence 
automation and network-centric system of systems (Goshorn 2010). Figure 1 depicts the 
Smart Cloud System of Systems model used for representing a network-centric system of 
systems. The Smart Cloud SoS is made up of a major cloud node and several “mini 
cloud” nodes. The “mini clouds” represent nodes at tactical sites or at sites in which an 
operator and/or analyst is using data from the cloud to make a decision. The main cloud 
node represents a set of enterprise cloud nodes that perform further analysis of the data 




Figure 1.  Smart cloud system of systems (after Goshorn 2013). 
In terms of mini-clouds, there are two kinds: smart sensor mini clouds, and 
command and control mini clouds. The smart sensor mini clouds collect and analyze data 
from sensors in multiple domains, such as social media and the physical domain, creating 
sensor feed data from the Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) systems. In 
addition to the raw data feed (e.g., video feed or social media feed), these mini-clouds 
also perform a first-pass level of automation and provide output in a standardized alert 
data file format to the main cloud. The main cloud further fuses the data alerts using 
automation software, stores the data on the main cloud, and finally distributes the right 
data to the right user. 
Finally, the command and control “mini clouds” serve as the hubs to gather input 
from the operators and analysts, and also to provide situational awareness (SA) in the 
form of alerts. The operators input and configure the entire smart cloud system of 
systems based on what types of situational awareness alerts they want to receive 
(Goshorn 2013). 
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B. DISCUSSION WITH VADM JAN TIGHE ON CYBER SA APPLIED TO 
SMART CLOUD SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS 
 
Figure 2.  VADM Tighe discusses the need for cyber situational awareness 
within Smart Cloud System of Systems at the Distributed-GIG 
Intelligence Automation Systems (DGIAS) Lab for Military and 
Homeland Security (author in far right of picture) (from Ammon 2013). 
As a member of the Smart Cloud System of Systems project, it was an honor to 
receive direct stakeholder input from our NPS Interim President, VADM Jan Tighe, who 
was also acting as director, Decision Superiority OPNAV N2N6F4 at the time, and is 
now currently serving as Commander, Fleet Cyber Command/Commander, 10th Fleet. 
During this guest lecture, VADM Tighe discussed information dominance and 
information warfare (IW) and shared her experiences as a senior IW officer.  
In this discussion, the need for capturing information assurance of data within the 
smart cloud system of systems was relayed by VADM Tighe. As further discussed with 
the primary advisor of this thesis, this means it is important to monitor the information 
assurance of the data in its different states of “data at rest,” “in transit,” and “in use” as it 
 4 
moves throughout the smart cloud system of systems. More background on information 
assurance is provided in Chapter II. 
After hearing the importance of being able to monitor information assurance 
within a cloud environment, and realizing all of the important systems connected to the 
cloud that could end up with fatal ramifications if the information is not assured, the 
author developed this concept for solving information assurance behavior analysis based 
on this need and the existing intelligence automation capabilities from prior research 
(Goshorn 2010).   
As an outcome of this lecture and discussion, this thesis and one other were 
conceived, as documented in an article published by NPS (Ammon 2013). 
C. ADDITIONAL STAKEHOLDER INPUT ON CYBER SA OF SMART 
CLOUD SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS 
This section discusses the stakeholder input received by the author both directly 
and indirectly, which directed this thesis topic. By participating in the Smart Cloud 
System of Systems project, the author had access to discussions with several stakeholders 
(Goshorn, 2013). Direct input from U.S. Navy (USN) stakeholders included Vice 
Admiral (VADM) Jan Tighe, U.S. Navy, along with the Chief Technology Officer (CTO) 
of United States Northern Command/North American Aerospace Defense Command 
(USNORTHCOM/NORAD) Science & Technology (S&T) office. Indirect input was 
derived from the Office of Naval Research (ONR) along with stakeholders within 
Singapore, such as the Singapore Armed Forces.   
1. USN Stakeholder Input 
As discussed in the previous section, the need for providing information assurance 
of data within a cloud environment was discussed by VADM Tighe. This discussion is 
what sparked the development of the capability architected in this thesis. 
2. NORTHCOM/NORAD Stakeholder Input 
As part of being in the Smart Cloud project within the SE3201 Engineering 
Systems Conceptualization course, stakeholder Dr. Hal Moore, CTO of NORAD-
 5 
NORTHCOM/ S&T Office, discussed operational scenarios that are of importance to 
him. In this discussion, he relayed the need to be prepared for cyber attacks on the smart 
cloud system of systems (SoS) when the SoS is deployed in a tactical environment for the 
purpose of supporting a Human Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operation. More 
specifically, understanding the validity and integrity of the data alerts that are sent to the 
decision maker at the Command and Control “mini cloud” was of upmost interest. 
This discussion not only confirmed the need to have information assurance of data 
to ensure its confidentiality, integrity, and availability, it also scoped which operational 
scenario the thesis should use: the HA/DR scenario. 
3. Office of Under Secretary of Defense, Policy Stakeholder Input 
As part of the smart cloud system of systems project, access to additional 
stakeholders at the Joint Field Experimentation (JIFX) was made available.  
 
Figure 3.  Mr. Al Miller (third from left) from USD(P) discusses the need for 
interoperable alerts within a smart cloud system of systems (author on 
far left.) 
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For example, as captured in Figure 3, the Science and Engineering Advisor, Mr. 
Al Moore, for Policy Integration from the Office of Secretary of Defense, Policy 
(OUSD(P)), discussed the importance of generating alerts that are interoperable within 
the smart cloud system of systems.   
This requirement was taken into consideration as this thesis concept system does 
output its alerts using an interoperable standard, as discussed in Section B of Chapter II.  
4. Office of Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics Stakeholder Input 
As part of the smart cloud system of systems project, access to additional 
stakeholders at the JIFX was made available.  
 
Figure 4.  Mr. Richard Marchant (far right) from OUSD (AT&L) discusses the 
need to perform test and evaluation of new capabilities (author second 
from right). 
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For example, as captured in Figure 4, Mr. Richard Marchant from the Office of 
Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD (AT&L)) 
discusses the need for performing test and evaluation of new capabilities that trace to 
requirements.   
This thesis includes a traceability matrix in Chapter III that maps the proposed 
system’s capability to originating requirements. In addition, this thesis provides a 
preliminary test and evaluation of the capability’s proof-of-concept. 
5. Office of Naval Research Stakeholder Input 
In SE3201 Engineering Systems Conceptualization course, the primary advisor, 
Dr. Goshorn presented the need for an intelligence automation infrastructure within the 
smart cloud system of systems. This infrastructure uses the Detect-Identify-Predict-React 
(DIPR) model that is described in previous work and is reviewed in Chapter II (Goshorn 
2010).  
Additionally, the cyber application of this DIPR intelligence automation 
framework is considered under current research for Office of Naval Research for Code 
30, ISR Thrust Program Manager. In this case, stakeholder input is received indirectly 
from the advisor’s research with the Office of Naval Research for a framework where 
learning can be achieved based on cyber sensor deployment on the smart cloud system of 
systems. Figure 5 explains the big picture setup of using DIPR to automate cyber 
situational awareness of smart cloud system of systems, called “blue team” cyber 
behavior intelligence automation. “Red team” cyber behavior intelligence automation 
refers to automating when and how someone should perform a cyber attack on the smart 
cloud system of systems. Further background on how to apply the DIPR Intelligence 
automation framework to do this from a blue team perspective performing active cyber 
defense is found in previous research (Jurjonas 2012). Background on applying cyber 
intelligence automation from a red team perspective is provided in other research in 
addition to this thesis (Deptula 2013). 
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Figure 5.  Research with the Office of Naval Research applies the Detect-
Identify-Predict-React (DIPR) intelligence automation framework to 
cyber situational awareness within a smart cloud system of systems 
(Goshorn 2013). 
6. Singapore Armed Forces and Other Singaporean Stakeholder Input 
Finally, as part of this stakeholder analysis review, a preliminary research review 
on potential stakeholder within Singapore was conducted. From this research, the most 
significant stakeholder determined was the Singapore Armed Forces and their new Cyber 
Defence Operations Hub. On June 29, 2013, Defence Minister Dr. Ng Eng Hen (Figure 
6) announced the setting up of the hub in order to “fight increasingly prevalent cyber 




Figure 6.  Defence Minister Dr. Ng Eng Hen announces the new Cyber 
Defence Operations Hub on June 29, 2013 (Lim 2013). 
Additional Singaporean stakeholders include research and development 
organizations such as Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), who launched a cyber research 
and development center in Singapore, in cooperation with Singapore’s Economic 
Development Board (The Jerusalem Post 2014). A photograph supporting the launch of 
the Singapore IAI R&D Center is captured in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7.  Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) cyber research and development 
center in Singapore (Jewish Business News 2014).   
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D. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE/DISASTER RELIEF OPERATION  
A humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operation was the scenario 
selected by various stakeholders for the smart cloud system of systems project. HA/DR 
operations support the nation or region under a disaster in order to minimize deaths and 
suffering in the affected public. Also, HA/DR operations are supposed to help improve 
security and stability in the region after a disaster. Finally, HA/DR operations help 
transition the region to prepare for long-term recovery. Example activities that occur 
during an HA/DR operation include providing technical aid to the region, building 
disaster relief warehouses, maintaining emergency operation centers, building shelters 
and potentially building fire stations. Finally, during these operations, essentials such as 
food, water, and medication are delivered and distributed throughout the region hit by the 
disaster (USSOUTHCOM 2014).  
Figure 8 depicts how the smart cloud system of systems can be deployed in a 
HADR scenario for the purpose of detecting terrorist attacks in an area where there are 
multiple crowds forming. This project assumed there is an operation going on where 
there are both social media sensors and camera sensors (on both unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV) platforms and tower-based ground platforms) that are performing surveillance of 
an area where aid is being provided to the masses of people.  
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Figure 8.  Application of smart cloud SoS during a humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief operation (after Goshorn 2013). 
From stakeholder opinion, there is concern that there are terrorist attacks in the 
area (both cyber and physical). For the smart cloud system of systems project, an 
architecture was put together detecting physical attacks in the area of the HA/DR 
operation.   
For this thesis, a capability and architecture is proposed for how to detect cyber 
terrorist attacks within the smart cloud system of systems that is being used to perform 
surveillance for physical terrorist attacks.  
E. CAPABILITY GAP AND PROPOSED CAPABILITY CONCEPT 
This section first describes the capability gap of need for cyber situational 
awareness within a smart cloud system of systems, which this thesis addresses and is 
based on stakeholder input. This section then concludes by describing the concept of the 
proposed capability to fill the capability gap; that is, a cyber situational awareness system 
of systems. 
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1. Capability Gap 
Whether it is a system used in real time during a mission or it is a system being 
assessed for vulnerabilities prior to being deployed, automation of cyber situational 
awareness (specifically information assurance) of any system supporting military 
operations is crucial. Operators in any mission need assurance that the data being used to 
support that mission is confidential, maintains its integrity, and is available throughout 
the mission. Additionally, before any system is deployed, such information assurance of 
that system needs to be categorized by the DoD in order to authorize its deployment 
(Young 2011; Onuskanich 2011). 
Maintaining situational awareness of the data is even more crucial in a cloud 
environment where data is accessible to multiple users. Because data is more widely 
available to more users, it is well known that many governments are creating specific 
measures for how to assess information assurance in such cloud frameworks. One 
example of these measures is the United States’ FedRamp organization (GSA 2014). 
Additionally, in cloud environments, the amount of data that needs to be monitored for 
vulnerabilities is overwhelming. There are not enough analysts to manually handle the 
data that are collected from such monitoring systems of a cloud framework (Hamel 
2013). Thus, a systems approach to automate cyber situational awareness of data and 
systems within cloud systems and to augment analysts’ work is needed.   
Finally, in applications where the data collected will help save lives, as in natural 
disaster situations, it is important to ensure the data being collected has not been 
tampered with, but that it maintains its integrity (IDA 2013).  
To fill these needs, this thesis chooses to apply an automated cyber situational 
awareness system to monitor social media data collected in a smart cloud system of 
systems. This will demonstrate an example of one type of data that needs to be monitored 
and for which its information confidentiality, integrity, and availability must be assured.   
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2. Proposed Concept 
The proposed solution should provide the user with cyber situational awareness 
and command and control ability. There are two types of cyber defense: passive and 
active defense. The proposed solution should exploit these defenses and provide the 
ability to reinforce each other. This thesis will look at providing a high-level concept 
cyber situational awareness system of systems (SoS) with the ability to both passively 
monitor data and devices within a network, such as a smart cloud SoS, as well as actively 
monitor the network and devices within a smart cloud SoS.   
Specifically, the concept will focus on passive defense to provide information 
assurance of data vulnerability within the smart cloud SoS by providing information 
assurance alerts with the usage of automating tools. Data collected within a smart cloud 
SoS vary from warfighting platforms such as weapon systems and sensor systems, and 
from main cloud stems. The potential loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
such data must be avoided, and thus there is a need to automate cyber situational 
awareness in a smart cloud SoS.  
This thesis proposes a system of systems engineering methodology for integrating 
and configuring an intelligence automation system for the purpose of enabling cyber 
command and control (C2) and cyber situational awareness (SA). This methodology 
includes performing the systems engineering process on the overarching SoS with the 
main focus on just one of the supporting systems. In particular, this thesis first proposes 
an overarching cyber defense system of systems architecture demonstrating how systems 
work independently and together for enabling command and control and providing cyber 
situational awareness. It is first made up of the overarching Cyber SA and C2 (CSAC2) 
system, followed by two defense systems that are performing intelligence automation via 
the Detect-Identify-Predict-React framework (Figure 9). The two cyber defense systems 
are the Cyber Attack Detection SA (CADSA) system, which performs active cyber 
defense operations, and the Information Assurance (IA) SA (IASA) system, which 
performs passive cyber defense operations. This thesis documents the high-level system 
of systems architecture while focusing on the progress of the systems engineering process 
of the passive cyber defense system in particular.  
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Figure 9.  Concept diagram for cyber situational awareness of a smart cloud 
system of systems. The cyber SA system of systems utilizes two 
parallel DIPR intelligence automation systems (one passive cyber 
defense and one active cyber defense) that both interact with each other 
and also independently provide cyber alerts to the overarching cyber 
SA system. 
Thus, in this thesis, the systems engineering process is applied to the IASA 
system, which applies DIPR to perform passive cyber defense. After going through the 
systems engineering process and generating an architecture with an analysis of 
alternatives, this thesis implements and describes an instantiated proof-of-concept system 
of a portion of the IASA system, with documented test and evaluation results. 
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The initial conceptual requirements of this system of systems are documented as 
needing to be capable of (1) monitoring information assurance of information within 
specified systems in a cloud framework, along with (2) monitoring for specific cyber 
attacks on a specified system, (3) alerting information of interest to an operator, and 
finally (4) allowing the end user to perform command and control over his or her cyber 
assets. 
3. Thesis Research Questions 
In order to determine the apt solution for the IASA system, this section presents 
the primary and subsidiary research questions investigated during the thesis research for 
proposing a solution to the proposed concept. 
Primary Research Question: How does one apply system of systems engineering 
to create an architecture for automating cyber situational awareness of specified 
information within a smart cloud system of systems? 
Subsidiary Research Questions: 
1.  What functions would an automated cyber situational awareness system 
perform, in particular, one that automates information assurance of 
specified data? 
2.  How does one model and monitor cyber behaviors of specified 
information on a system? 
3.  What are the approaches to automate detecting and tracking degradation of 
information assurance (i.e., degradation of information confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability)? 
4.  What are the cyber sensors needed to capture data sufficient enough to 
automatically detect and track degradation of information assurance? 
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F. THESIS STRUCTURE 
The need for automating information assurance for cyber situational awareness 
within the smart cloud system of systems was discussed in this chapter, followed by the 
proposed overall architecture of the systems. A general background and literature search 
on the controls to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data is described in 
Chapter II. In Chapter III, the detailed system diagrams of the proposed architecture are 
discussed with a focus on the IASA system using IDEF0 diagrams. The feature matrix 
used to demonstrate the concept of the Detect, Identify, Predict and React (DIPR) model 
for the IASA system is also mentioned. In Chapter IV, the proof of concept for the Detect 
and Identify of the DIPR model is demonstrated and the physical architecture of IASA is 
discussed. Finally, conclusions, recommended improvements to the proof of concept, and 




In addition to background on the systems engineering process used in this thesis, 
this chapter provides a brief overview of the three technologies used in this thesis, as well 
as background on the operational scenario selected for this thesis. The three technologies 
used are the smart cloud system of systems, Detect-Identify-Predict-React (DIPR), and 
information assurance. The operational scenario and assumptions in question are 
reviewed, followed by the brief overview of the systems engineering process used in this 
thesis.  
A. SMART CLOUD SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS 
1. Smart Cloud System of Systems 
The smart cloud SoS is the assumed external system whose data needs are 
monitored for the cyber situational awareness system of systems. This infrastructure is 
made up of smart sensor mini clouds, a command and control mini cloud, and the main 
cloud, as shown in Figure 10. The command and control “mini clouds” represent nodes at 
tactical sites or at sites in which an operator and/or analyst is using data from the cloud to 
make a decision. The main cloud node represents a set of enterprise cloud nodes that 
perform further analysis of the data and is in charge of routing the right data to the right 
operator/analyst. The smart sensor mini cloud senses a particular domain, such as the 
physical domain, cyber domain, or social media domain, in order to generate raw sensor 
data that captures each domain at a certain time. 
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Figure 10.  Smart cloud system of systems (after Goshorn 2013). 
In other words, the smart sensor mini clouds collect and analyze data from social 
media and video feed data from the Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
system, and provide output in a standardized alert data file format to the main cloud. The 
main cloud further fuses these data, distributes it, and stores the data on the main cloud. 
The command and control mini cloud serves as the hub to gather input from the operators 
and also to provide cyber situational awareness in the form of alerts. It is important to 
monitor the IA of the data in its different states of data at rest, in transit, and in use within 
the smart cloud system of systems. 
B. DETECT, IDENTIFY, PREDICT, REACT INTELLIGENCE 
AUTOMATION MODEL 
The intelligence automation model, Detect-Identify-Predict-React, or DIPR, has 
been used primarily in sensor-based networks to generate usable, intelligent feedback 
from raw data provided by conventional sensors such as cameras (Goshorn 2011). It has 
been used also for automating dynamic defensive cyber operations, which focused 
primarily on the cyber sensors and detection portions (Jurjonas 2012; Deptula 2013). 
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Figure 11.  Concept of DIPR model and its subsystem (after Goshorn 2011). 
In addition to the sensor systems, there are four intelligence automation systems 
that further process the sensor data, providing alerts that are increasing in complexity at 
each output of each system. Therefore the alerts that are output from Reaction are the 
most complex where the sensor data is the lowest level of information, in terms of 
complexity.  
This section briefly discusses each DIPR subsystem: Detect, Identify, Predict, and 
React. 
1. Detect System 
Sensors deployed in smart sensor mini clouds provide raw data for processing by 
a system/processor running the Detect programs. The raw sensor data is analyzed by the 
Detect subsystem, which creates the detect classifications in the data feature matrix. 
Features are a low-level classification created from raw data and are describing an object 
of interest (Goshorn 2011).  
2. Identify System 
The Identify subsystem processes the Detect features, recognizes when multiple 
features or conditions have occurred simultaneously, and fuses the data together, 
generating an intelligent state to which that data belongs. Rules to implement the 
recognition must be developed and input into the program to determine what feature 
conditions are required. Ideally, it would be an adaptable learning system that could tailor 
itself over time (Goshorn 2011). 
 20 
3. Predict System 
At each time interval, the intelligent states generated by the Identify subsystem 
are then input into the Predict subsystem. These states are then processed by a 
generalized high-level classifier that recognizes spatiotemporal patterns of states. The 
input states that also include geo-locations and time of events associated with each state 
form object sequences, or behaviors. They are then classified as “normal” behaviors, 
“abnormal” behaviors, and “unclassified” behaviors, based on predefined or learned 
patterns. These behaviors are then used to predict the future state of the information 
under observation and output to the React subsystem (Goshorn 2011).  
4. React System 
The React subsystem provides an appropriate action (control signal and/or alert) 
based on these predefined rules of engagement associated with each predicted behavior 
(Goshorn 2011). For example, a control signal to close network ports or encrypt files or 
folders may be issued as a form of reaction to predict behaviors. 
5. Extensible Markup Language (XML) Interoperable File Standard for 
the DIPR Alerts 
Each object that is detected in the Detect stage within DIPR has its own feature 
space matrix, which is a data structure that stores all the values of the object features that 
were detected. There are several methods to implement the feature space matrix. One 
common method is to use the Extensible Markup Language (XML) file standard 
(w3school 2014). 
XML is a structured language, such as HyperText Markup Language (HTML), 
which was created to structure, transport, and store data. The structure of how data is 
organized in the document is customized by whoever is creating the XML files 
(w3school 2014). Figure 12 shows a sample of an XML document. 
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Figure 12.  XML document example (from w3schools 2014). 
The XML standard is well suited for DIPR application to the cyber field. In 
Chapter III, more specific details of the adaptation are described to show how the 
subsystems and functions work to provide automated information assurance and 
situational awareness for a smart cloud system of systems. 
C. SOCIAL MEDIA AND HUMAN ASSISTANCE/DISASTER RELIEF 
OPERATIONS 
Recall from Chapter I that the operational scenario selected describes the 
deploying of a cyber situational awareness system of systems to monitor for cyber attacks 
against the smart cloud system of systems that is monitoring for physical terrorist attacks 
in a region in Singapore that had hypothetically been hit with a natural disaster, all as a 
part of an HA/DR operation.   
This scenario also assumes that social media is used by people affected by the 
disaster during the HA/DR operations. Additionally, this selected HA/DR scenario of a 
smart cloud system of systems within Singapore assumes that social media is used in 
Singapore, since one of the smart sensor mini clouds is a social media smart sensor mini 
cloud that could sense all publicly available social media generated within Singapore.   
To ensure that this deployment of a smart cloud system of systems is valid, and 
that its data is being generated, would require situational awareness of its information 
assurance; this section describes both the background on the social media usage within 
Singapore as well as the background on social media usage during HA/DR operations. 
Finally, to provide background on what sample social media looks like, this 
section finishes with a brief example of what Twitter “raw sensor data” looks like. For 
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this thesis, this is the type of data for which information assurance would be monitored 
during an HA/DR scenario. 
1. Social Media in Singapore 
According to a report by Rock Publicity in 2012, social media is heavily adopted 
in Singapore. In particular, 68.1% of the total population of 3,530,100 in 2012 regularly 
interacted with social media on their devices at home or anywhere on their mobile 
devices (Rock Publicity 2012).  
With respect to which social media applications are used, most Singaporeans have 
accounts with multiple social media sites. In fact, Singaporeans are some of the heaviest 
mobile users on average in Asia, and use social media on mobile devices more than 96% 
of the rest of the world. Interestingly, they also buy more tablet devices per capita than all 
of the other Asian nations, appearing to lead the Asian region with respect to the most 
social media used on these devices. Additionally, almost half of the country’s total 
population is reported to have a Twitter account, which is higher than the world average. 
In terms of which city in the world uses Twitter the most, Singapore is reported to be 
ranked eleventh. In particular, it is reported that the average Singaporean Twitter user 
tweets more than twice per day (Rock Publicity 2012).   
To conclude, it is reasonable to consider that social media data generated within 
Singapore will be a valid form of sensor data requiring information assurance to be 
monitored within the smart cloud system of systems. 
2. Use of Social Media in HA/DR Operations 
This section reviews the usage of social media applications during HA/DR 
operations.  
In general, social media is used to maintain connections with family and friends, 
with some used to learn more about consumer products, interact with those who enjoy a 
common hobby or interest, and also to meet new acquaintances. Additionally, there are 
many reasons why people use social media during disasters. During a disaster scenario, 
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people may use social media to look for both readily available information and 
information that has a lot of content (Fraustino et al. 2012).  
There are many examples of when people have used social media during disaster 
situations. First, half an hour before a potentially fatal storm hit a festival in Belgium in 
2011, it is reported that people tweeted more than 2,000 related tweets. Then, after the 
first four hours had passed in this disaster, this number increased to more than 80,000 
tweets (Perng et al. 2012). Another example of using social media during a disaster 
occurred during the 2008 earthquake in China. Interestingly, in this case, the first reports 
describing the disaster did not come from the government, but rather from Twitter (Mills 
et al. 2009). The sources of several of the tweets were from both local and national news 
media. In addition to the media, an unexpected number of tweets were created by Twitter 
account users that were specific to disasters, as well as ordinary citizens that reported 
tweets for the purpose of updating other citizens with helpful information (Mims 2010). 
3. Social Media Sensor Data 
This section provides a brief example of what Twitter “raw sensor data” looks 
like. For this thesis, this is the type of data for which information assurance would be 
monitored during an HA/DR operation. 
A social media sensor can be thought of as a software program that senses a 
specific social media platform (Goshorn 2013). For example, the Twitter Application 
Programming Interface (API) is an application programming interface that allows anyone 
with a Twitter account to automatically sense a small percentage of all public tweets in 
real time (for streaming) or in non-real time, which searches a subset of all tweets within 
a specified timeframe (batch processing). The Twitter API is made up of two discrete 
APIs: the Representational State Transfer (REST) API and a Streaming API. It presently 
supports the following data formats: XML, JSON, and the RSS and Atom syndication 
formats (Twitter Developers 2012).  
A sample of the Twitter sensor data is illustrated in Figure 13. The current format 
used is JavaScript Object Notation (JSON format). 
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Figure 13.  Twitter sample payload, JSON format (from GitHub 2014). 
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D. INFORMATION ASSURANCE 
This section covers the characteristics of data that determines information 
assurance, the three different states that data can be in, the 20 critical security controls, 
and the type of cyber sensors that can be used to achieve the goal of low-level 
automation/feature extraction from sensor data describing information assurance of 
specified data. 
1. Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability  
Information assurance can be determined by three characteristics of data: 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Confidentiality of data means that unauthorized 
users cannot access the data. Integrity of data means data unauthorized users cannot 
change the data. Availability of data means that data is readily available to authorized 
users (UM School of Medicine 2006). 
2. Data at Rest, Data in Transit, and Data in Use 
Data can exist in any one of three states, as illustrated in Figure 14 (Ball 2013). 
The states are “data at rest,” “data in transit,” and “data in use.”  
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Figure 14.  The three states of data are “data in use,” “data at rest,” and “data in 
motion” (from Ball 2013). 
Data Loss Prevention (DLP) is one type of methodology to identify, monitor, and 
protect information. There are many ways to do this, such as deep inspection, contextual 
security analysis of transactions, and finally through a central management framework. 
The first purpose of the DLP systems is to detect unauthorized use of information that 
should remain confidential. The second purpose is to prevent unauthorized use of 
information that should remain confidential. Finally, the last purpose is to prevent 
unauthorized transmission of the data (Norton 2011). 
For data at rest, DLP can be achieved by locating and cataloging sensitive 
information stored. While monitoring and controlling the movement of sensitive 
information across the enterprise network is essential for data in motion/transit, the same 
can be said for monitoring and controlling the movement of sensitive information on end-
user systems for data in use or in a process. 
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a. Data at Rest (Stored Data) 
Data at rest refers to data that is not in used and is stored on a storage device such 
as a hard disk, CD/DVD, or flash memory device in the form of files or database. Data 
protection for the data at rest state can be in the form of data encryption and access 
logging. 
b. Data in Motion/Transit (Transmit Data) 
Data in motion or transit refers to data that is being transmitted or moving 
between applications (within the computer) or networks (within a network) using 
available communication linkage such as a local area network (LAN), Wifi, or computer 
bus. Data protection for data in transit can be in the form of constant monitoring and 
protection of data such as Transport Layer Security (TLS), Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), 
and Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) protocols, and usage of data loss prevention 
software. Protocols such as TLS, SSL, and IPsec encrypt data packets for secure 
transportation and decryption by authorized parties. Data loss prevention software 
monitors network traffic to help prevent unauthorized transmission of data within and 
exiting enterprise network. In addition, there should be a policy implemented to prevent a 
user’s negligence in data handling. 
c. Data in Use/Process 
Data in use are data that are actively being read, modified, or managed by an 
application, and the data is stored temporarily in memory, such as random-access 
memory (RAM) or Page Files. This is the most vulnerable state as the data must allow 
changes to be made and are not protected from attack; therefore, the data requires 
constant monitoring. Data protection for data in use can be achieved by ensuring access 
only by trusted applications or authorized users, preventing snooping by third-party 
applications, and employing full memory encryption. 
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3. Cyber Sensors for Information Assurance 
This section provides a brief background on cyber sensors in general, based out of 
previous research (Goshorn 2009).   
There are two ways of deploying cyber sensors in general. They are classified by 
where are the monitoring is required—that is, monitoring of the network or monitoring of 
network devices, also known as the host. Therefore, cyber sensors can be generally 
categorized by the location in which they have been deployed, either network based or 
host based (Deptula 2013). 
Specific to automating information assurance, network-based cyber sensors are 
used to monitor information in the state of data in transit, while host-based cyber sensors 
are used to monitor information in the state of data at rest and data in use. 
Furthermore, automation of information assurance requires the data to be 
monitored for loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Therefore, when 
choosing sensors, not only is the data state important, the ability to capture the 
probabilities of the data maintaining confidentiality, integrity, and availability, based on 
extracted features of the sensor data, is important. This concept is further discussed in 
Chapter III. 
E. CRITICAL SECURITY CONTROLS 
The SANS Institute worked with information assurance and cybersecurity experts 
from government and industry to determine the highest priority controls that one could 
employ in order to have an effective cyber defense system. For example, information 
assurance requires data’s confidentiality, integrity, or availability is preserved. 
Recommendations put forward by the SANS Institute’s Critical Control 17 describes the 
application of Data Loss Prevention (DLP) in order to actively monitor both data at rest 
and data in transit (SANS Institute 2014). This control provides the initial concept for 
achieving information assurance of the data.   
Out of the 20 controls they identified, eight critical controls are found to be the 
most applicable to automating information assurance in the smart cloud system of 
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systems. The eight controls used in this thesis are described subsequently, with the most 
relevant control being Control 17 (SANS Institute 2014).   
1. Critical Control 1: Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized 
Devices 
Control 1 requires that an organization detects and maintains an up-to-date 
inventory of both authorized and unauthorized devices within the network (SANS 
Institute 2014). This concept is depicted in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15.  Control 1 system entity relationship diagram (from SANS n.d.). 
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2. Critical Control 3: Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software 
on Mobile Devices, Laptops, Workstations, and Servers 
Control 3 requires that organizations ensure their hardware and software for 
mobile devices, laptops, workstations, and servers are configured for security (SANS 
Institute 2014). This is depicted Figure 16. 
 




3. Critical Control 10: Secure Configurations for Network Devices  
Control 10 requires that all network devices (such as routers, firewalls, switches) 
are configured for security, as depicted in Figure 17 (SANS Institute 2014).   
 




4. Critical Control 11: Limitation and Control of Network Ports, 
Protocols, and Services 
Control 11 requires that network ports, protocols, and services within each 
computer system on a network be limited to allow input and output of required data doing 
required services (SANS Institute 2014). This concept is depicted in Figure 18. 
 




5. Critical Control 13: Boundary Defense 
Control 13 requires that a network have layers of defense by employing 
protective/monitoring systems throughout the network to create hierarchical boundaries 
in the network (SANS Institute 2014). This concept is depicted in Figure 19. 
 




6. Critical Control 14: Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of Audit 
Logs 
Control 14 requires that all organizations maintain, monitor, and actively analyze 
logs that audit both the network and the systems on the network (SANS Institute 2014). 
This concept is depicted in Figure 20. 
 




7. Critical Control 17: Data Loss Prevention 
Control 17 requires that the network be actively monitoring for data loss by 
employing scanning devices on data storage systems as well as on the network (SANS 
Institute 2014). This concept is depicted in Figure 21. 
 




8. Critical Control 19: Secure Network Engineering 
Control 19 requires that the engineering that goes into architecting and 
implementing an organization’s network should be inherently secure in its design (SANS 
Institute 2014). This concept is depicted in Figure 22. 
 
Figure 22.  Control 19 system entity relationship diagram (from SANS 
Institute). 
F. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
This section gives a brief review of the systems engineering model, the Vee 
model, used in architecting the new capability presented in this thesis (Buede 2009). 
The Vee model represents the lifecycle development of large scale systems and 
software development projects, with an emphasis on the engineering process for a system 
being developed. The left side of the Vee represents the beginning three phases of life 
cycle development. The process starts from the top left of the Vee with the definition of 
the stakeholders’ operational need; the operational requirements are decomposed, as we 
move from left to right in Figure 23, to system level requirements to specifications of 
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each component. The horizontal line that is drawn under the middle intersection of the 
Vee represents the start of the design process of the product by the discipline engineers. 
Examples of such are electrical engineers, mechanical engineers, chemical engineers, 
civil engineers, aerospace engineers, and computer science engineers. The horizontal line 
also represents the part of the process in which there is overlap between the design and 
integration activities. The right side of the Vee indicates the integration and qualification 
activities of the system engineering. It involves putting together the lower-level 
components into higher level components and finally the assembly of high-level 
components into the system. All the activities up the Vee involve validating and verifying 
the newly assembled system elements to determine that each element meets the 
requirements or specifications that were established in the design phase and that the 
system meets the stakeholders’ needs (Buede 2009).  
 
Figure 23.  Systems engineering “Vee” model (from Buede 2009, p. 10). 
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III. PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE 
Recall that in Chapter I we reviewed products generated during the 
conceptualization phase of the solution presented in this thesis. This is the first phase of 
the systems engineering Vee model, as introduced in Chapter II. This chapter reviews 
products implemented in the following phases of the Vee Model. Namely, the first 
section reviews the operational scenarios analysis to develop the system performance and 
requirements. Next, the functional definition and decomposition is conducted to 
determine the required functions of the system. The IDEF0 function modeling method is 
used to model the system data flow and control of the proposed IASA system. 
Requirements analysis will provide the starting point for tracing of the physical solution 
to the system requirements. Mapping of the physical solution to the functions of the 
IASA is shown in the form of traceability matrix. The validation and verification of a 
portion of the proposed system will be discussed in Chapter IV in the proof-of-concept 
section. As this thesis is focused on the functions of IASA, the physical architecture will 
similarly focus on the physical architecture of IASA only, as highlighted in Figure 24. 
A. CYBER SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND COMMAND AND 
CONTROL SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS CONCEPT 
This thesis proposes a system of systems engineering methodology for integrating 
and configuring an intelligence automation system for the purpose of enabling cyber 
command and control (C2) and cyber situational awareness (SA). This methodology 
includes performing the systems engineering process to at least one of the supporting 
systems. To approach this topic, this thesis first proposes an overarching system of 
systems architecture demonstrating how systems work independently and together for 
enabling command and control and providing cyber situational awareness. This system of 
systems is depicted in Figure 24. It is first made up of the overarching Cyber SA and C2 
(CSAC2) system, followed by the Cyber Attack Detection SA (CADSA) system, and 
finally, the Information Assurance (IA) SA (IASA) system. This thesis will document the 
high-level system of systems architecture while focusing on the progress of the systems 
engineering process of one system in particular. In this thesis, the systems engineering 
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process is applied to the IASA system. After going through the systems engineering 
process and generating an architecture with an analysis of alternatives, this thesis 
implements and describes an instantiated proof-of-concept system of a portion of the 
IASA system, with documented test and evaluation results. 
The initial requirements of this system of systems are documented as needing to 
be capable of (1) monitoring information assurance of information within specified 
systems in a cloud framework, along with (2) monitoring for specific cyber attacks on a 
specified system, (3) alerting information of interest to an operator, and finally (4) 
allowing the end user to perform command and control over his or her cyber assets. 
 
 
Figure 24.  Focus on IASA in the cyber situational awareness system of systems 
of specified information in the cloud (boxed in red). 
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1. Detailed Discussion on Preliminary Proposed System of Systems 
Architecture 
First, there is the Cyber SA system that interfaces with the operator. In order to 
obtain cyber situational awareness, an operator should be able to subscribe to an 
automated cyber situational awareness cloud service of interest, where he or she 
determines both the systems and information to be monitored (performing command and 
control over all cyber monitoring sensors/systems associated with that cyber situational 
awareness mission). Such a system also provides a visualization of the situational 
awareness of the desired systems, including alerts of interest. 
Cyber situational awareness defense can be defined and decomposed into two 
main areas: passive cyber defense, such as information assurance, formerly termed by the 
U.S. Cyber Command as Department of Defense (DoD) GIG Operations (DGO), along 
with active cyber defense, such as cyber attack detection, termed DoD Cyber Operations 
(DCO) (Young 2011). Since cyber defense is decomposed into these two types of 
operations, the cyber situational awareness system needs two different monitoring 
systems: Active Cyber Defense SA systems and Passive Cyber Defense (Information 
Assurance) SA systems. Figure 24 represents the latter two systems denoted as CADSA 
system and IASA system. Both systems are proposed to include cyber sensors and 
intelligence automation systems in order to automate situational awareness of their cyber 
terrain. These systems are configured by the overarching cyber situational awareness 
system, to which they both provide alerts. Additionally, it is proposed that the two 
supporting systems provide alerts to each other. Thus, these three systems (the 
overarching Cyber SA system, the IASA system, and the CADSA system) interact with 
each other in a system of systems (SoS) environment, as shown in Figure 24. The benefit 
of having these applications in an SoS architecture is that it ensures synergy between the 
applications and produces a robust setup. This setup enables each system to support the 
others to achieve the desired results of assuring information confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability. Finally, the system of systems works together in alerting the operators in the 
event of cyber attacks or degradation in information assurance. 
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a. Cyber Situational Awareness (Cyber SA) System  
The overarching Cyber SA System is the C2 system that acts as a gateway 
between the cloud architecture and the human operator. The cyber behaviors to be 
monitored are determined by the operators and uploaded here. Monitoring parameters can 
be in the form of the types of files to monitor and on what devices, along with certain 
specified behaviors such as change in a file’s properties, and cyber attacks. In such events 
the alerts are sent to the operators and the recipients of the alerts. The type of data to be 
monitored, which is sometimes called a “datacube,” is also specified here. Usually this 
datacube is associated with data collected to support another operation. It is also data 
whose confidentiality, integrity, and availability need to be assured. The lack of these 
information assurance attributes is cause for an alert to the operators, as it may 
compromise a mission that the datacube supports. Information describing the situational 
awareness of the datacube information assurance is visualized at this system. For 
example, during a HA/DR operation in Singapore, social media data may need to be 
collected from the public in order to assess the state of civilians in that region, since it is 
documented that citizens use social media resources to communicate during disasters 
(IDA 2013). In collecting and analyzing such data, it is important to visualize the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the datacubes in order to be assured that the 
troops assisting in the operation are provided accurate, concise, and relevant information. 
b. Cyber Attack Detection Situational Awareness (Cyber Attack Detection 
SA) System 
The Cyber Attack Detection Situational Awareness (CADSA) System obtains the 
configuration parameters from the overarching Cyber SA System and continuously 
monitors for signs of a cyber attack; it will alert the main cloud automatically in the event 
of an attack. In addition, alerts will be sent to the IASA cloud service in the form of 
additional monitoring parameters to heighten the information assurance level. It is 
important to be alerted on attempted cyber attacks on the infrastructure, including the 
datacubes being used. It is important to have situational awareness of the datacube’s 
vulnerability of being exploited. For example, in a rescue operation, if a hacker attacks 
the rescue support systems supporting rescue operations, in addition to destroying 
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infrastructure, he or she may steal or modify the social media data that was collected in 
order to mislead the rescue personnel.   
c. Information Assurance Situational Awareness (Information Assurance 
SA) System 
Finally, the IASA System obtains the configuration parameters from the 
overarching Cyber SA system and continuously monitors specified files (datacubes) on 
specified devices for changes made. If the datacube performs a behavior that was of 
interest to the operator and is indicative of loss of confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability, all operators who subscribed to that behavior (via the Cyber SA System) are 
alerted automatically once trigger events occur. In addition, alerts will also be sent to the 
CADSA cloud system to highlight detected information assurance behaviors compared to 
the standard behaviors. This action heightens the alert level for monitoring of cyber 
attacks within the network infrastructure. This interdependent relationship among the 
three cloud systems allows higher synergy and information sharing. 
B. SYSTEM OPERATIONAL USE CASES  
1. Scenario 1: Operator Input Configuration Setting to System 
The operator enters the inputs desired for the network/files to be monitored by 
Cyber Situational Awareness and Command and Control (CSAC2). CSAC2 receives 
inputs from the operator and determines if the input is classified as Case 1 and/or Case 2. 
Under Case 1, CSAC2 generates configuration files to Information Assurance Situational 
Awareness (IASA). IASA receives configuration files and checks configuration files for a 
security key or encrypted operator signature. Once the configuration files are accepted, 
IASA will adjust the monitoring areas. Under Case 2, CSAC2 generates configuration 
files to Cyber Attack Detection Situational Assurance (CADSA). CADSA receives 
configuration files and checks configuration files for a security key or encrypted operator 
signature. Once the configuration files are accepted, CADSA will adjust monitoring 
network.  
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2. Scenario 2: CADSA Detects an Abnormality in the Network 
CADSA detects an abnormality in the monitored port(s) and sends an alert to 
CSAC2. CSAC2 receives the alert and checks for a security key or encrypted signature. 
Once the alert is found to be authentic, CSAC2 alerts the operator (see scenario 6). 
CADSA also sends an alert to IASA to increase the frequency of monitoring of files or to 
increase the number of files to monitor. IASA receives the alert, checks for a security key 
or encrypted signature, and increases the number of files to be monitored or the 
frequency of monitoring of files. CADSA will self-configure to increase its monitoring 
rate of the network. 
3. Scenario 3: CADSA Detects an External Attack 
CADSA detects an attack at port number XX and sends an alert to CSAC2. 
CSAC2 receives the alert and checks for a security key or encrypted signature. Once the 
alert is found to be authentic, CSAC2 alerts the operator (see scenario 6). CADSA sends 
an alert to IASA to increase the frequency of monitoring of files or to increase the 
number of files to monitor. IASA receives the alert, checks for a security key or 
encrypted signature, and encrypts high-priority files which are predetermined by the 
operator. CADSA will close the attacked port(s) and increase the monitoring rate of the 
network to achieve heightened security level status. 
4. Scenario 4: IASA Detects an Abnormality in the Network 
IASA detects an abnormality in one of the monitored files or directories, and 
IASA sends an alert to CSAC2. CSAC2 receives the alert and checks for a security key 
or encrypted signature. Once the alert is found to be authentic, CSAC2 alerts the operator 
(see scenario 6). IASA sends an alert to CADSA to increase the monitoring rate of the 
network. CADSA receives the alert, checks for a security key or an encrypted signature 
and increases the monitoring rate of the network. IASA will self-configure to increase the 
frequency of file monitoring or the number of files to be monitored. 
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5. Scenario 5: IASA Detects Internal Unauthorized Changes to High 
Priority Files 
IASA detects unauthorized changes to high priority files or unauthorized access to 
high security level folders and sends an alert to CSAC2. CSAC2 receives the alert and 
checks for a security key or encrypted signature. Once the alert is found to be authentic, 
CSAC2 alerts the operator (see scenario 6). IASA sends an alert to CADSA to increase 
the monitoring rate of the network to achieve heightened security level status. CADSA 
receives the alert, checks for a security key or an encrypted signature, and increases the 
monitoring rate of the network. IASA will encrypt high priority files which are 
predetermined by operator. 
6. Scenario 6: CSAC2 Visualizes Alerts to the Operator  
CSAC2 receives alerts from CADSA/IASA and displays alerts to the operator. 
C. INTELLIGENCE AUTOMATION APPLIED TO INFORMATION 
ASSURANCE 
This section reviews the technologies or methodologies used to automate 
information assurance.  
1. Monitored Targets To Automate Behavior Analysis 
Recall that data can be in the form three states, namely, data at rest, data in transit 
and data in use. Suitable sensors must be deployed and used in order to correctly monitor 
and capture the status of the data in terms of their confidentiality, integrity and 
availability.  
2. Cyber Sensors To Sense for Targets 
There are two ways of deploying cyber sensors in general. They are classified by 
where are the monitoring is required—that is, monitoring of the network or monitoring of 
network devices, also known as the host. Therefore, cyber sensors can be generally 
categorized by the location in which they have been deployed, either network based or 
host based (Deptula 2013). 
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Specific to automating IA, network-based cyber sensors are used to monitor 
information in the state of data in transit, while host-based cyber sensors are used to 
monitor information in the state of data at rest and data in use. 
Furthermore, automation of information assurance requires the data to be 
monitored for loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Additionally, since data 
changes states between data at rest, data in transit, and data in use, there is a need to 
monitor the data’s loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability for each state. Table 1 
provides the nine different combinations of IA across the three different states of data 
(Sij), where i represents the IA condition and j represents the state of data. 
 







 At Rest S11 S21 S31 
In Transit S12 S22 S32 
In Use S13 S23 S33 
Table 1.   Nine combinations of information assurance at different 
states of data. 
This thesis will specifically focus on hosts with the Microsoft (MS) Windows 
operating system for the data at rest state, namely S11, S21, and S31. The remaining 
sections discuss background on cyber sensors used to assure the confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of data in MS Windows for the data at rest state. 
a. Sensors for MS Windows 
There are numerous readily available methods or applications that can be used as 
sensors to automate information assurance of data in its three states; they can be grouped 
into the type of operation systems or platforms and the data states. The main focus will be 
on sensors that are used in Microsoft’s operating system and data in storage and the in-
use state. Sensors to monitor data in transit will not be covered. Commands found in 
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Microsoft’s DOS and MATLAB program can be used to monitor data in the storage state, 
and the program Process Explorer by Mark Russinovich can be used for data in the in-use 
state.  
(1) MS DOS Command‒DIR. The DIR command in Microsoft’s DOS 
provides a list of the available contents of a directory with information including the 
data’s last modification date and time, the file size, and owner. It offers the option to 
search through a specified directory to display files of interest. 
DIR [drive:][path][filename] [/A[[:]attributes]] [/B] [/C] [/D] [/L] [/N] [/O[[:]sortorder]] 
[/P] [/Q] [/R] [/S] [/T[[:]timefield]] [/W] [/X] [/4] 
/Q – Display the owner of the file. 
/S - Displays files in specified directory and all subdirectories (Search) 
(2) MATLAB Command‒DIR. The DIR command in MATLAB has 
functions similar to the DIR command in DOS. It provides the file and folder names in 
the MATLAB current folder, last modification date and time, and file size. It is 
commonly used with the command LISTING to obtain attributes of the file, an example 
of the result of the command is shown in Figure 25.  
 
Figure 25.  Typical result of the DIR command in MATLAB. 
(3) MATLAB Command‒FILEATTRIB. FILEATTRIB is another command 
in MATLAB that provides information regarding a file. FILEATTRIB gets attribute 
values for the current folder, using the structure shown in Figure 26, where Name is 
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always a string containing the current folder name. For the other fields, a value of 0 
indicates that the attribute is off, 1 indicates that the attribute is on, and NaN indicates 
that the attribute does not apply. 
 
Figure 26.  Typical result of the FILEATTRIB command in MATLAB. 
(4) Process Explorer. Process Explorer is a program used to monitor data that 
are in use. It lists information regarding the user, the time the data is accessed, and the 
files used by the program (Figure 27). However, information regarding the location 
where the data is temporarily stored in memory is not available. 
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Figure 27.  Output display of Process Explorer. 
3. Detect, Identify, Predict, and React (DIPR) Intelligence Automation 
for Data Behavior Analysis 
The concept of using the DIPR model to achieve information assurance of data is 
feasible. Information and status regarding the targeted data can be extracted and 
monitored by sensor software that resides or is deployed in the storage hosts or networks. 
Different types of sensors are required depending on the targeted data state (at rest, in 
transit, or in use) and the operating system in which the data resides. The focus of this 
thesis will be mainly on monitoring data in the at-rest state (storage) and operating in an 
MS Windows environment, using tools designed for operating in the MS Windows 
system. How the DIPR model is used to process cyber sensor data in order to look for 
unauthorized behavior of the data is discussed in the functional decomposition of the 
Information Assurance Situational Awareness system within this chapter. 
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D. EXTERNAL SYSTEMS DIAGRAM 
Figure 28 provides the External Systems Diagram (content diagram) for Cyber 
Situational Awareness & Information Assurance of Smart Cloud System of Systems (The 
System). The System (A0) interacts with four external systems: the operators (B1), Smart 
Cloud SoS (B2), Government Cyber Policy Department (B3), and the External 
Infrastructures (B4).  
 
Figure 28.  External system diagram for the system. 
The operations are the personnel operating the system and overseeing the 
system’s command and control function. The smart cloud SoS is the external info-
communication system in which the operator has a stake and interest; it is also the system 
whereby the sensors from The System will be deployed to monitor the information 
assurance of the data and network security. The Government Cyber Policy Department is 
the government body which has a stake and interest in the smart cloud SoS and provides 
the overall governing policies in the cyber environment. External Infrastructures provide 
the platforms, environments, hardware, and network architecture in which the entire 
system of systems resides and operates. 
There are two types of external input to The System. They are monitoring targets 
from the smart cloud SoS(s) and user inputs from the operator(s). Monitoring targets are 
the information data and network from the smart cloud SoS in which the operator is 
interested in ensuring situation awareness and information assurance. User inputs are the 
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command and control/operational instructions from the operator to The System to 
determine how The System operates in the overall cyber environment. It also consists of 
the operator’s internal policies on how The System interacts with internal components 
and externally.   
There are two types of external output from The System. They are the cyber 
control signals to the smart cloud SoS(s) and alerts to the operator(s). Cyber control 
signals are the control instructions to the smart clouds where The System’s sensors are 
deployed; it provides the signal to encrypt files/folders of interest or to heighten the 
network security level due to the detection of an abnormality in the environment in which 
the information confidentiality, integrity, and availability are degraded. Alerts are output 
from The System to the operator when degradation of information confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability is detected in the environment. 
There are three types of constraints on The System. They include constraints from 
the infrastructure of the smart cloud SoS and external infrastructures and policies from 
the Government Cyber Control Department. The operating environment (software/OS) in 
which the smart cloud SoS operates will constrain the type of sensors that can be 
deployed in the cloud. The external infrastructures of the entire cyber environment will 
determine the limitations and constraints that The System will face, such as the hardware 
and networking architecture used. The cyber policies set by the government will 
determine the boundaries or limitations of how The System operates and interacts with 
external bodies.  
There are two types of enablers: the platform where the sensors will be deployed 
in the smart clouds and the platform of the external infrastructures which determine how 
The System will operate and function in the cyber environment. 
E. FUNCTIONS DEFINITION AND DECOMPOSITION 
The Functional Hierarchy of the system, as shown in Figure 29, “Provide Cyber 
Situational Awareness & Information Assurance of Smart Cloud SoS” consists of four 
main functions, namely “Provide Command & Control (A1),” “Provide Situational 
Awareness (A2),” “Provide Information Assurance SA (A3),” and “Provide Cyber Attack 
 52 
Detection SA (A4).” Function A1 and A2 will form the main interface whereby the 
command and control (C2) and the feedback from the alerts will be provided to the 
operators on the status of the systems. 
 
Figure 29.  Functional hierarchy of the system. 
Within the function A1, three sub-functions allow the operators to create and 
issue configuration/parameter files to the other subsystem (SoS) and the interface to 
interact with the operators. Together these functions enable the command and control of 
the SoS. The three sub-functions of A1 are “Issue Config Files (A1.1),” “Create Config 
File (A1.2),” and “Provide User Interface (A1.3).” 
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Within the function A2, three sub-functions provide the operators with the current 
status or situation awareness of the system/network based on the configurations set by the 
operators, by receiving filtered alerts from the two subsystems, A3 & A4. The three sub-
functions of A2 are “Received Alerts (A2.1),” “Monitor/Filter Alerts Based on User 
Configuration (A2.2),” and “Display Filtered Alerts (A2.3).” 
Within the function A3, four sub-functions monitor the files/folders of interest 
selected by the operators for suspicious activities and unauthorized changes to the 
files/folders. The sub-functions also issue alerts to subsystems A2 & A4 and the control 
signal to encrypt the files/folders. The four sub-functions of A3 are “Received & 
Configure Files/Alerts (A3.1),” “Sense Information Data Environment (A3.2),” “Provide 
Intelligence Automatize Framework for IASA (A3.3),” and “React with Alerts & Control 
Signal (A3.4)”. 
Within the function A4, four sub-functions monitor the networks based the 
configurations set by the operators for suspicious activities and attacks on the network. 
The sub-functions issue alerts to subsystems A2 & A3 and the control signal to 
counter/control the attacks. The four sub-functions of A4 are “Received & Configure 
Files/Alerts (A4.1),” “Sense Network Activities (A4.2),” “Detect Attacks (A4.3),” and 
“React with Alerts & Control Signal (A4.4).” 
The function “Sense Information Data Environment (A3.2)” consists of three sub-
functions to sense the data based on its state (Figure 30). The three states are data in 
stored (data at rest) condition on storage devices, such as a hard disk; data in transit state 
through transmission on the network system, such as transferring the data on WIFI or 
LAN; and the final state when the data is in use by the user where the data is residing in 
memory, such as RAM on the user’s device. 
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Figure 30.  Functional hierarchy of the function “Sense Information Data 
Environment.” 
The function “Provide Intelligence Automatize Framework for IASA (A3.3)” 
consists of four sub-functions that make up the DIPR process (Figure 31). DIPR is the 
key component/feature to provide smart automation by filtering the large amount of data 
collected from the sensors to manageable information that are critical to the operator, or 
reaction as countermeasure. This study will be focusing on the Detect and Identify 
framework of this function. 
 
Figure 31.  Functional hierarchy of the function “Provide Intelligence 
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Depending on the category of the monitored data, the sub-function of “Detect 
(A3.3.1)” receives data from sensors deployed on external smart clouds, detects and 
extracts relevant information from the data, and updates the target detect feature matrix. 
“Identify (A3.3.2)” looks for changes in the feature matrix based on intelligent state rules 
using its four sub-functions, “Receive Intelligent State Rule (A3.3.2.1),” “Search Detect 
Feature Matrix using Rules (A3.3.2.2),” and “Update Identify Feature Matrix (A3.3.2.3).” 
The function “Identify Learner (A3.3.2.4)” operates asynchronously from the main 
identify functions to learn and set/change intelligent state rules. 
F. IDEF0 DIAGRAM OF PROPOSED SYSTEM 
1. Cyber Situational Awareness and Information Assurance of Smart 
Cloud SoS IDEF0 (A0 Level 1) 
This level 1 IDEF0 diagram (Figure 32) depicts the level 1 functions of The 
System (A0). As detailed previously in the External Systems Diagram description, there 
are several external inputs, outputs, constraints, and enablers that interact with The 
System.  
 












































Figure 32 specifies which level 1 functions of The System the external inputs, 
outputs, constraints, and enablers interact with. Interaction is defined as the transfer of 
EMMI (Energy, Material, Material Wealth, Information) to the external systems 
(indicated in blue). Monitoring targets from the smart cloud SoS provides inputs to both 
the “Provide Information Assurance SA (A3)” and “Provide Cyber Attack Detection SA 
(A4)” functions. Both functions A3 and A4 will receive the targets of interest for the 
deployment of smart sensors. User Inputs from the Operators go to “Provide Command & 
Control (A1),” which will receive and configure the system based on the inputs.  
The Policy constraint sets how The System functions and is received by “Provide 
Command & Control (A1),” which creates the configuration files and parameter settings 
based on the policy given. The External Infrastructures constraint determines how the 
system functions interact and operate with the external systems and also among each 
other within The System. The External Infrastructures constraint goes to all four 
functions (A1 to A4). The Smart Cloud Infrastructure constraint only affects functions 
“Provide Information Assurance SA (A3)” and “Provide Cyber Attack Detection SA 
(A4)” as the type of operating system used in different smart clouds will determine the 
type of sensors being deployed.  
Output in the form of filtered alerts will be given by the “Provide Situation 
Awareness (A2)” function. All alerts from A3 and A4 will be intelligently analyzed, 
filtered, and summarized before creating alerts as output to the Operators (B1). Output as 
reaction to the current situation (threat or attack) will be given by the “Provide 
Information Assurance SA (A3)” and “Provide Cyber Attack Detection SA (A4)” 
functions in the form of cyber control signals/instructions to smart clouds to counter or 
react to the situation. 
The two types of enablers, the platform where the sensors will be deployed in the 
smart clouds (for A3 & A4 only) and the platform of the external infrastructures, 
determine how all the functions will operate in the cyber environment. Figure 32 also 
specifies how the level 1 functions of The System interact with each other. Interaction or 
the transfer of EMMI within the system/level is indicated in black. The Parameter Setting 
from “Provide Command & Control (A1),” which is determined by the policy constraint, 
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will indirectly impact and determine the operational constrains for functions A2 to A4. 
Based on the policy constraint given, configuration files created by “Provide Command 
& Control (A1)” will be the input for the functions A2 to A4. With the parameter setting 
and configuration files from A1, “Provide Information Assurance SA (A3)” and “Provide 
Cyber Attack Detection SA (A4)” functions will each create alerts based on the situation 
encountered. The Alert files from A3 & A4 will be input for A2. The A3 and A4 
functions also support each other with configuration files to ‘alert’ them to the current 
situation and advise on the need to increase the monitoring level. 
2. Information Assurance Situational Awareness IDEF0 (A3 Level 2) 
This level 2 IDEF0 diagram (Figure 33) depicts the functions of “Provide 
Information Assurance SA (A3).” As detailed previously with the IDEF0 diagram of The 
System (A0) description, there are several external inputs, outputs, constraints, and 
enablers that interact with The System.  
 
 
Figure 33.  Level 2 IDEF0 diagram of the function “Provide Information 



















































Figure 33 specifies which level 2 functions of A3 the external inputs, outputs, 
constraints, and enablers interact with. Interaction is defined as the transfer of EMMI to 
the external systems (indicated in blue). Data from monitored targets from the smart 
cloud SoS inputs to the “Sense Information Data Environment (A3.2)” function for 
analysis and filtering to the three different states in which the data can reside. 
Configuration files created by the A1 function will serve as inputs to the sub-functions of 
A3 and determine their operation environment.  
Configuration files created by the A4 function will provide additional 
configuration/constraints as a form of reaction due to the detected situation. The 
Parameter Setting constraint sets the A3 function and is received by “Receive & 
Configure Files/Alerts (A3.1),” which creates the parameter settings for the other sub-
functions of A3 (A3.2 to A3.4). The External Infrastructures constraint determines how 
the system functions interact and operate with the external systems and also with each 
other in The System. The External Infrastructures constraint goes to all four functions 
(A3.1 to A3.4). The Smart Cloud Infrastructure constraint only affects the function 
“Sense Information Data Environment (A3.2)” as the type of operating system used in 
different smart clouds will determine the type of data collected for analysis.  
From the situation gathered and analyzed by the A3.3 function in the form of a 
control signal, function A3.4 will create the required output to external functions in the 
form of cyber control signals for other functions in the system, alerts to CSAC2 for alerts 
to operators, and configuration/alert files to CADSA to increase synergy and information 
sharing between systems. 
The two types of enablers, the platform where the sensors will be deployed in the 
smart clouds (for A3.2 only) and the platform of the external infrastructures, determine 
how all the functions will operate in the cyber environment. 
Figure 33 also specifies how the level 2 functions of A3 interact with each other. 
Interaction or the transfer of EMMI within the system/level is indicated in black. The 
Parameter Setting from “Receive & Configure Files/Alerts (A3.1),” determined by the 
parameter setting and configuration/alert files from CADSA, will affect and determine 
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the operational environment of functions A3.1 to A3.3. Collected data from the targets 
will be broken down by “Sense Information Data Environment (A3.2)” function as three 
types of inputs for “Provide Intelligence Automotive Framework for IASA (A3.3).” The 
three types are Stored Data (Data at Rest), Transit Data (Data in Motion), and Data In 
Use, which encompass the entire range/state of the data/information. Data processed or 
analyzed by the A3.3 function will generate the required control signal to the “React with 
Alerts & Control Signal (A3.4)” for reaction to the situation. 
3. Sense Information Data Environment IDEF0 (A3.2 Level 3) 
This level 3 IDEF0 diagram (Figure 34) depicts the functions of the “Sense 
Information Data Environment (A3.2).” As detailed previously with the IDEF0 diagram 
of the function “Provide Information Assurance SA (A3)” description, there are several 
external inputs, outputs, constraints, and enablers that interact with A3.2.  
 





























This diagram specifies with which level 3 functions of A3.2 the external inputs, 
outputs, constraints, and enablers interact. Interaction is defined as the transfer of EMMI 
to the external systems, as indicated in blue. 
Data from monitored targets from the smart cloud SoS inputs to the “Sense Stored 
Information (A3.2.1),” “Sense Transit Information (A3.2.2),” and “Sense Information In 
Use (A3.2.3)” functions for analysis. Configuration files created by the A1 function will 
serve as inputs to sub-functions of A3.2 and determine their operation environment.  
The Parameter Setting constraint from the A3.1 function is received by all sub-
functions (A3.2.1 to A3.2.3) of A3.2 and will set how the sub-functions operate. The 
External Infrastructures constraint determines how the system functions interact and 
operate with the external systems and also with each other in The System. The External 
Infrastructures constraint goes to all four functions (A3.2.1 to A3.2.3). The Smart Cloud 
Infrastructure constraints will affect all sub-functions (A3.2.1 to A3.2.3) as the type of 
operating system used in different smart clouds will determine the type of data collected 
for analysis.  
The data gathered from the targets is sorted according to the type of sensors 
deployed in the smart clouds by the sub-functions A3.2.1 to A3.2.3. This data will be 
identified as three types of output for “Provide Intelligence Automotive Framework for 
IASA (A3.3)”—Stored Data (Data at Rest), Transit Data (Data in Motion), and Data In 
Use, which encompass the entire range/state of data/information. 
The two types of enablers, the platform where the sensors will be deployed in the 
smart clouds and the platform of the external infrastructures, determine how all the 
functions will operate in the cyber environment. 
There is no internal interaction within the A3.2 function. 
4. Sense Stored/Transit/In Use Information IDEF0 (A3.2.X Level 4) 
This level 4 IDEF0 diagram (Figure 35) depicts the functions of the “Sense 
Stored/Transit/In Use Information (A3.2.X).” The X represents the function numbering 
based on the type of data being processed, sensing of stored data, and whether the data is 
 61 
in transit or in use. These are numbered 1, 2, and 3, respectively. As detailed previously 
with the IDEF0 diagram of the function “Sense Information Data Environment (A3.2)” 
description, there are several external inputs, outputs, constraints, and enablers that 
interact with A3.2.X.  
 
Figure 35.  Level 4 IDEF0 diagram of function “Sense Stored/Transit/In Use 
Information.” 
This diagram specifies with which level 4 functions of A3.2.X the external inputs, 
outputs, constraints, and enablers interact. Interaction is defined as the transfer of EMMI 
to the external systems, as indicated in blue. The function “Receive/Process Config File 
(A3.2.X.1)” receives and processes the sensor data collected from monitored targets from 
the smart cloud SoS. Configuration files created by the A1 function will serve as inputs to 
sub-functions of A3.2.X and determine their operation environment.  
The Parameter Setting constraint from the A3.1 function is received by all sub-
functions (A3.2.X.1 to A3.2.X.4) of A3.2.X and will set how the sub-functions operate. 































operate with the external systems and also with each other in The System. The External 
Infrastructures constraint goes to all four functions (A3.2.X.1 to A3.2.X.4). The Smart 
Cloud Infrastructure constraint affects all functions of A3.2.X as the data collected in 
different smart clouds will determine the type of data analyzed.  
From the sensor data gathered, after filtering, processing, and recording by the 
functions of A3.2.X, function A3.2.X.4 will create the required output to A3.3 for DIPR 
analysis. 
The two types of enablers, the platform where the sensors will be deployed in the 
smart clouds and the platform of the external infrastructures, determine how all the 
functions will operate in the cyber environment. 
This diagram also specifies how the level 4 functions of A3.2.X interact with each 
other. Interaction or the transfer of EMMI within the system/level is indicated in black. 
Data on the target are first received by “Receive/Process Config File (A3.2.X.1).” The 
data are then analyzed, filtered, and sorted by “Sense Environment for Desired Target 
(A3.2.X.2)” before the result is recorded by the function “Write/Record Sensor Result 
(A3.2.X.3).” The results are transmitted to A3.3 for DIPR analysis by the function 
“Transmit Sensor Data (A3.2.X.4). 
5. Intelligence Automatize Framework for IASA IDEF0 (A3.3 Level 3) 
This level 3 IDEF0 diagram (Figure 36) depicts the functions of “Provide 
Intelligence Automatize Framework for IASA (A3.3).” As detailed previously with the 
IDEF0 diagram of the function “Provide Information Assurance SA (A3)” description, 




Figure 36.  Level 3 IDEF0 diagram of function “Provide Intelligence 
Automatize Framework for IASA.” 
This diagram specifies with which level 3 functions of A3.3 the external inputs, 
outputs, constraints, and enablers interact. Interaction is defined as the transfer of EMMI 
to the external systems, as indicated in blue. 
Inputs in the form of Stored Data (Data at Rest), Transit Data (Data in Motion), 
and Data In Use from A3.2 will input to the “Detect (A3.3.1)” function for analysis and 
detection of abnormality. Configuration files created by the A1 function will serve as 
inputs to sub-functions of A3.3 and determine their operation environment.  
The Parameter Setting constraint from the A3.1 function is received by all sub-
functions (A3.3.1 to A3.3.4) of A3.3 and will set how the sub-functions operate. The 
External Infrastructures constraint determines how the system functions interact and 
operate with the external systems and also with each other in The System. The External 





























From the data gathered from the inputs, after going through the DIPR analysis, 
the required control signal is created as output to “React with Alerts & Control Signal 
(A3.4)” for reaction to the situation. 
The enabler, External Infrastructure Platform, will determine how all the 
functions will operate in the cyber environment. 
This diagram also specifies how the level 3 functions of A3.3 interact with each 
other. Interaction or the transfer of EMMI within the system/level is indicated in black. 
Data collected are analyzed and abnormalities are detected by the “Detect (A3.3.1)” 
function; the output from it is input to the “Identify (A3.3.2)” function. Function A3.3.2 
further determines and identifies the possible causes and is output to the “Predict 
(A3.3.3)” function. Function A3.3.3 predicts the possible outcomes and outputs the 
analysis to the “React (A3.3.4)” function. Function A3.3.4 uses predetermined settings to 
select the reaction to the situation and outputs this selection as a control signal for the 
“React with Alerts & Control Signal (A3.4)” function. 
6. Detect IDEF0 (A3.3.1 Level 4) 
This level 4 IDEF0 diagram (Figure 37) depicts the functions of “Detect 
(A3.3.1).” As detailed previously with the IDEF0 diagram of the function “Provide 
Intelligence Automatize Framework for IASA (A3.3)” description, there are several 
external inputs, outputs, constraints, and enablers that interact with A3.3.1.  
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Figure 37.  Level 4 IDEF0 diagram of function “Detect.” 
This diagram specifies with which level 4 functions of A3.3.1 the external inputs, 
outputs, constraints, and enablers interact. Interaction is defined as the transfer of EMMI 
with the external systems, as indicated in blue. 
Depending on the types of Input (Stored Data, Transit Data and Data In Use), the 
sub-functions of A3.3.1 will receive them for detection function. Configuration files 
created by the A1 function will serve as inputs to sub-functions of A3.3.1 and determine 
their operation environment.  
The Parameter Setting constraint from the A3.3 function is received by all sub-
functions (A3.3.1.1 to A3.3.1.3) of A3.3.1 and will set how the sub-functions operate. 
The External Infrastructures constraint determines how the system functions interact and 
operate with the external systems and also with each other in The System. The External 
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After detection analysis, the detect outcome is output to “Identify (A3.3.2)” for 
identification against predetermined intelligent state rules.  
The enabler, External Infrastructure Platform, will determine how all the 
functions will operate in the cyber environment. 
There is no internal interaction between the sub-functions of A3.3.1. 
7. Detect Stored/Transit/In Use Data IDEF0 (A3.3.1.X Level 5) 
This level 5 IDEF0 diagram (Figure 38) depicts the functions of “Detect 
Stored/Transit/In Use Data (A3.3.1.X).” X represents the function numbering based on 
the type of data been processed (detection of stored data, data in transit, and in use) and is 
numbered 1, 2, and 3, respectively. As detailed previously with the IDEF0 diagram of the 
function “Detect (A3.3.1)” description, there are several external inputs, outputs, 
constraints, and enablers that interact with A3.3.1.X.  
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This diagram specifies with which level 5 functions of A3.3.1.X the external 
inputs, outputs, constraints, and enablers interact. Interaction is defined as the transfer of 
EMMI to the external systems, as indicated in blue. 
Depending on the types of Input (Stored Data, Transit Data and Data In Use), the 
sub-functions of A3.3.1.X will receive them for the detection function (A3.3.1.X.2). 
Configuration files created by the A1 function will serve as inputs to function A3.3.1.X.1 
which determines the operation environment of the other detection sub-functions 
(A3.3.1.X.2 to A3.3.1.X.5).  
The Parameter Setting constraint from the A3.3 function is received by all sub-
functions of A3.3.1.X and will set how the sub-functions operate. The External 
Infrastructures constraint determines how the system functions interact and operate with 
the external systems and also with each other in The System. The External Infrastructures 
constraint goes to all sub-functions of A3.3.1.X. 
The updated detect feature matrix will be released by function A3.3.1.X.5 as the 
detection outcome sent to “Identify (A3.3.2)” for identification against predetermined 
intelligent state rules.  
The enabler, External Infrastructure Platform, will determine how all the 
functions will operate and function in the cyber environment. 
This diagram also specifies how the level 5 functions of A3.3.1.X interact with 
each other. Interaction or the transfer of EMMI within the system/level is indicated in 
black. “Receive Detect Config File (A3.3.1.X.1)” will provide the configuration setting 
as the parameter setting (constraint) to the other sub-functions of Detect (A3.3.1). After 
receiving the sensor data, “Received New Sensor Data for Desired Target (A3.3.1.X.2)” 
will output the data to function A3.3.1.X.3. Function A3.3.1.X.3 will sense and pick up 
the required information based on the given setting from the data collected from the smart 
clouds. Function A3.3.1.X.4 updates the detect feature matrix based on the information 
collected; the updated feature matrix is then passed on to function A3.3.1.X.5 for out-
processing of the Detect (A3.3.1) function. 
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8. Identify IDEF0 (A3.3.2 Level 4) 
This level 4 IDEF0 diagram (Figure 39) depicts the functions of “Identify 
(A3.3.2).” As described previously with the IDEF0 diagram of the function “Provide 
Intelligence Automatize Framework for IASA (A3.3)” description, there are several 
external inputs, outputs, constraints, and enablers that interact with A3.3.2.  
 
Figure 39.  Level 4 IDEF0 diagram of function “Identify.” 
This diagram specifies with which level 4 functions of A3.3.2 the external inputs, 
outputs, constraints, and enablers interact. Interaction is defined as the transfer of EMMI 
to the external systems, as indicated in blue. 
Inputs from the Detect Function will be used initially by “Identify Learner 
(A3.3.2.6)” to build up the intelligent state rules, subsequently servicing additional 
learned rules to “Receive Identify Config File (A3.3.2.2). Both functions operate 
asynchronously. Configuration files created by the A1 function will serve as inputs to 
sub-functions of A3.3.2.2, which determine the operation environment of the other 















































The Parameter Setting constraint from the A3.3.2 function is received by sub-
functions A3.3.2.2 and A3.3.2.6 to determine how these functions operate and what 
intelligent state rules to implement. Intelligent state rules are rules that guide what the 
Identify function should look for in the feature matrix. The External Infrastructures 
constraint determines how the system functions interact and operate with the external 
systems and also with each other in The System. The External Infrastructures constraint 
goes to all four functions (A3.3.2.1 to A3.3.2.6). 
After the identifying analysis is completed and the feature matrix is updated with 
the identification information by function A3.3.2.5, the outcome is output to “Predict 
(A3.3.3)” for prediction analysis. 
The enabler, External Infrastructure Platform, will determine how all the 
functions will operate in the cyber environment. 
This diagram also specifies how the level 4 functions of A3.3.2 interact with each 
other. Interaction or the transfer of EMMI within the system/level is indicated in black. 
After receiving the feature matrix from the detect function, “Receive Detect Feature 
Matrix (A3.3.2.1) will output the matrix to function “Search Detect Feature Matrix using 
Rules (A3.3.2.3).” The consolidated intelligent state rules from “Receive Identify Config 
File (A3.3.2.2)” function will be used by function A3.3.2.3 to perform the search function 
of the entire collected “Detect” feature matrix. Function A3.3.2.2 also provides the 
configuration setting as the parameter setting (constraint) to the other sub-function of 
Identify (A3.3.2). The search outcome from Function A3.3.2.3 will update the feature 
matrix with identification information by the “Update Identify Feature Matrix (A3.3.2.4)” 
function; the updated feature matrix is then passed on to function A3.3.2.5 for out-
processing of Identify (A3.3.2) function. Function A3.3.2.6 will provide additional 
learned rules to function A3.3.2.2. 
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G. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
This section itemizes the derived functional requirements corresponding to the 
IDEF0 level decompositions presented in the previous section. 
1. High Level System (A0) Functional Requirements (Level 0) 
Req. 0.1 Cyber Situational Awareness & Information Assurance of Smart Cloud 
SoS (A0) shall receive user inputs from operator (B1). 
Req. 0.2 Cyber Situational Awareness & Information Assurance of Smart Cloud 
SoS (A0) shall receive monitoring targets from Smart Cloud SoS (B2). 
Req. 0.3 Cyber Situational Awareness & Information Assurance of Smart Cloud 
SoS (A0) shall adhere to infrastructure constraint from Smart Cloud SoS (B2). 
Req. 0.4 Cyber Situational Awareness & Information Assurance of Smart Cloud 
SoS (A0) shall adhere to infrastructure constraint from External Infrastructures (B4). 
Req. 0.5 Cyber Situational Awareness & Information Assurance of Smart Cloud 
SoS (A0) shall adhere to policy constraint from Government Cyber Policy Departments 
(B3). 
Req. 0.6 Cyber Situational Awareness & Information Assurance of Smart Cloud 
SoS (A0) shall output alerts to operator (B1). 
Req. 0.7 Cyber Situational Awareness & Information Assurance of Smart Cloud 
SoS (A0) shall output cyber control signals to Smart Cloud SoS (B2). 
Req. 0.8 Cyber Situational Awareness & Information Assurance of Smart Cloud 
SoS (A0) shall provide the function to obtain awareness of cyber situation and assurance 
of information of Smart Cloud SoS. 
2. C2 (A1) Functional Requirements (Level 1) 
Req. 1.1 C2 (A1) shall receive user inputs from operator (B1). 
Req. 1.2 C2 (A1) shall adhere to policy constrain from Government Cyber Policy 
Department (B3). 
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Req. 1.3 C2 (A1) shall adhere to infrastructure constraint from External 
Infrastructures (B4). 
Req. 1.4 C2 (A1) shall output parameter setting to SA (A2), IASA (A3), and 
CADSA (A4). 
Req. 1.5 C2 (A1) shall output configuration file to SA (A2), IASA (A3), and 
CADSA (A4). 
Req. 1.6 C2 (A1) shall provide command and control function for the system. 
3. SA (A2) Functional Requirements (Level 1) 
Req. 2.1 SA (A2) shall receive configuration file from C2 (A1). 
Req. 2.2 SA (A2) shall receive alert from IASA (A3) and CADSA (A4). 
Req. 2.3 SA (A2) shall adhere to parameter setting constraint from C2 (A1). 
Req. 2.4 SA (A2) shall adhere to infrastructure constraint from External 
Infrastructures (B4). 
Req. 2.5 SA (A2) shall output filtered alert to operator (B1). 
Req. 2.6 SA (A2) shall provide situational awareness function for the system. 
4. IASA (A3) Functional Requirements (Level 1) 
Req. 3.1 IASA (A3) shall receive configuration file from C2 (A1). 
Req. 3.2 IASA (A3) shall receive monitoring targets from Smart Cloud SoS (B2). 
Req. 3.3 IASA (A3) shall adhere to parameter setting constraint from C2 (A1). 
Req. 3.4 IASA (A3) shall adhere to infrastructure constraint from External 
Infrastructures (B4). 
Req. 3.5 IASA (A3) shall adhere to infrastructure constraint from Smart Cloud 
SoS (B2). 
Req. 3.6 IASA (A3) shall adhere to configuration/alert file from CADSA (A4). 
Req. 3.7 IASA (A3) shall output cyber control signals to Smart Cloud SoS (B2). 
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Req. 3.8 IASA (A3) shall output configuration/alert file to CADSA (A4). 
Req. 3.9 IASA (A3) shall output alert file to SA (A2). 
Req. 3.10 IASA (A3) shall provide IASA function for the system. 
5. CADSA (A4) Functional Requirements (Level 1) 
Req. 4.1 CADSA (A4) shall receive configuration file from C2 (A1). 
Req. 4.2 CADSA (A4) shall receive monitoring targets from Smart Cloud SoS 
(B2). 
Req. 4.3 CADSA (A4) shall adhere to parameter setting constraint from C2 (A1). 
Req. 4.4 CADSA (A4) shall adhere to infrastructure constraint from External 
Infrastructures (B4). 
Req. 4.5 CADSA (A4) shall adhere to infrastructure constraint from Smart Cloud 
SoS (B2). 
Req. 4.6 CADSA (A4) shall adhere to configuration/alert file from IASA (A3). 
Req. 4.7 CADSA (A4) shall output cyber control signals to Smart Cloud SoS 
(B2). 
Req. 4.8 CADSA (A4) shall output configuration/alert file to IASA (A3). 
Req. 4.9 CADSA (A4) shall output alert file to SA (A2). 
Req. 4.10 CADSA (A4) shall provide cyber attack detection situational awareness 
function for the system. 
6. Receive & Configure Files/Alerts (A3.1) Functional Requirements 
(Level 2) 
Req. 3.1.1 Receive & Configure Files/Alerts (A3.1) shall receive configuration 
file from C2 (A1). 
Req. 3.1.2 Receive & Configure Files/Alerts (A3.1) shall adhere to 
configuration/alert file from CADSA (A4). 
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Req. 3.1.3 Receive & Configure Files/Alerts (A3.1) shall adhere to parameter 
setting constraint from C2 (A1). 
Req. 3.1.4 Receive & Configure Files/Alerts (A3.1) shall adhere to infrastructure 
constraint from External Infrastructures (B4). 
Req. 3.1.5 Receive & Configure Files/Alerts (A3.1) shall output parameter setting 
to Sense Information Data Environment (A3.2), Intelligence Automatize Framework for 
IASA (A3.3), and React with Alerts & Control Signal (A3.4). 
Req. 3.1.6 Receive & Configure Files/Alerts (A3.1) shall provide receive and 
configure files/alerts function for IASA. 
7. Sense Information Data Environment (A3.2) Functional 
Requirements (Level 2) 
Req. 3.2.1 Sense Information Data Environment (A3.2) shall receive 
configuration file from C2 (A1). 
Req. 3.2.2 Sense Information Data Environment (A3.2) shall receive monitoring 
targets from Smart Cloud SoS (B2). 
Req. 3.2.3 Sense Information Data Environment (A3.2) shall adhere to parameter 
setting constraint from Receive & Configure Files/Alerts (A3.1). 
Req. 3.2.4 Sense Information Data Environment (A3.2) shall adhere to 
infrastructure constraint from External Infrastructures (B4). 
Req. 3.2.5 Sense Information Data Environment (A3.2) shall adhere to 
infrastructure constraint from Smart Cloud SoS (B2). 
Req. 3.2.6 Sense Information Data Environment (A3.2) shall output feature matrix 
of Stored Data, Transit Data, and Data In Use collected from the monitored target. 
Req. 3.2.7 Sense Information Data Environment (A3.2) shall provide the function 
to sense information data environment for the IASA. 
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8. Intelligence Automatize Framework for IASA (A3.3) Functional 
Requirements (Level 2) 
Req. 3.3.1 Intelligence Automatize Framework for IASA (A3.3) shall receive 
feature matrix for Stored Data, Transit Data, and Data In Use from Sense Information 
Data Environment (A3.2). 
Req. 3.3.2 Intelligence Automatize Framework for IASA (A3.3) shall receive 
configuration file from C2 (A1). 
Req. 3.3.3 Intelligence Automatize Framework for IASA (A3.3) shall adhere to 
parameter setting constraint from Receive & Configure Files/Alerts (A3.1). 
Req. 3.3.4 Intelligence Automatize Framework for IASA (A3.3) shall adhere to 
infrastructure constraint from External Infrastructures (B4). 
Req. 3.3.5 Intelligence Automatize Framework for IASA (A3.3) shall output 
control signal to React with Alerts & Control Signal (A3.4). 
Req. 3.3.6 Intelligence Automatize Framework for IASA (A3.3) shall provide the 
function of intelligence automatize framework for IASA. 
9. React with Alerts & Control Signal (A3.4) Functional Requirements 
(Level 2) 
Req. 3.4.1 React with Alerts & Control Signal (A3.4) shall receive control signal 
from Intelligence Automatize Framework for IASA (A3.3). 
Req. 3.4.2 React with Alerts & Control Signal (A3.4) shall receive configuration 
file from C2 (A1). 
Req. 3.4.3 React with Alerts & Control Signal (A3.4) shall adhere to parameter 
setting constraint from Receive & Configure Files/Alerts (A3.1). 
Req. 3.4.4 React with Alerts & Control Signal (A3.4) shall adhere to 
infrastructure constraint from External Infrastructures (B4). 
Req. 3.4.5 React with Alerts & Control Signal (A3.4) shall output cyber control 
signal to Smart Cloud SoS (B2). 
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Req. 3.4.6 React with Alerts & Control Signal (A3.4) shall output alert to SA 
(A2). 
Req. 3.4.7 React with Alerts & Control Signal (A3.4) shall output 
configuration/alert file to CADSA (A4). 
Req. 3.4.8 React with Alerts & Control Signal (A3.4) shall provide the function to 
react with alerts and control signals for IASA. 
10. Sense Stored/Transmitted/In Use Information (A3.2.X) Functional 
Requirements (Level 3) 
Letter X is used to represent the sub-functions of A3.2, covering Sense Stored 
Information (A3.2.1), Transmitted Information (A3.2.2) and In Use Information (A3.2.3). 
Req. 3.2.X.1 Sense Stored/Transmitted/In Use Information (A3.2.X) shall receive 
configuration file from C2 (A1). 
Req. 3.2.X.2 Sense Stored/Transmitted/In Use Information (A3.2.X) shall receive 
monitoring targets from Smart Cloud SoS (B2) 
Req. 3.2.X.3 Sense Stored/Transmitted/In Use Information (A3.2.X) shall adhere 
to parameter setting constraint from Receive & Configure Files/Alerts (A3.1). 
Req. 3.2.X.4 Sense Stored/Transmitted/In Use Information (A3.2.X) shall adhere 
to infrastructure constraint from External Infrastructures (B4). 
Req. 3.2.X.5 Sense Stored/Transmitted/In Use Information (A3.2.X) shall adhere 
to infrastructure constraint from Smart Cloud SoS (B2). 
Req. 3.2.X.6 Sense Stored/Transmitted/In Use Information (A3.2.X) shall output 
feature matrix of Stored/Transmitted/In Use data collected from the monitored target. 
Req. 3.2.X.7 Sense Stored/Transmitted/In Use Information (A3.2.X) shall provide 
the function to sense Stored/Transmitted/In Use information for intelligence automatize 
framework for IASA. 
 76 
11. Receive/Process Config File (A3.2.X.1) Functional Requirements 
(Level 4) 
Letter X is used to represent the sub-functions of A3.2, covering Sense Stored 
Information (A3.2.1), Transmitted Information (A3.2.2) and In Use Information (A3.2.3). 
Req. 3.2.X.1.1 Receive/Process Config File (A3.2.X.1) shall receive monitoring 
targets from Smart Cloud SoS (B2). 
Req. 3.2.X.1.2 Receive/Process Config File (A3.2.X.1) shall receive configuration 
file from C2 (A1). 
Req. 3.2.X.1.3 Receive/Process Config File (A3.2.X.1) shall adhere to parameter 
setting constraint from Receive & Configure Files/Alerts (A3.1). 
Req. 3.2.X.1.4 Receive/Process Config File (A3.2.X.1) shall adhere to 
infrastructure constraint from External Infrastructures (B4). 
Req. 3.2.X.1.5 Receive/Process Config File (A3.2.X.1) shall adhere to 
infrastructure constraint from Smart Cloud SoS (B2). 
Req. 3.2.X.1.6 Receive/Process Config File (A3.2.X.1) shall output processed 
configuration file to Sense Environment for Desired Target (A3.2.X.2). 
Req. 3.2.X.1.7 Receive/Process Config File (A3.2.X.1) shall provide the function 
to receive and process configuration file for sense data information function of IASA. 
12. Sense Environment for Desired Target (A3.2.X.2) Functional 
Requirements (Level 4) 
Letter X is used to represent the sub-functions of A3.2, covering Sense Stored 
Information (A3.2.1), Transmitted Information (A3.2.2) and In Use Information (A3.2.3). 
Req. 3.2.X.2.1 Sense Environment for Desired Target (A3.2.X.2) shall receive 
monitoring targets from Receive/Process Config File (A3.2.X.1). 
Req. 3.2.X.2.2 Sense Environment for Desired Target (A3.2.X.2) shall receive 
configuration file from C2 (A1). 
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Req. 3.2.X.2.3 Sense Environment for Desired Target (A3.2.X.2) shall adhere to 
parameter setting constraint from Receive & Configure Files/Alerts (A3.1). 
Req. 3.2.X.2.4 Sense Environment for Desired Target (A3.2.X.2) shall adhere to 
infrastructure constraint from External Infrastructures (B4). 
Req. 3.2.X.2.5 Sense Environment for Desired Target (A3.2.X.2) shall adhere to 
infrastructure constraint from Smart Cloud SoS (B2). 
Req. 3.2.X.2.6 Sense Environment for Desired Target (A3.2.X.2) shall output 
sensed target data to Write/Record Sensor Result (A3.2.X.3). 
Req. 3.2.X.2.7 Sense Environment for Desired Target (A3.2.X.2) shall provide the 
function to sense data from monitored targets for sense data information function of 
IASA. 
13. Write/Record Sensor Result (A3.2.X.3) Functional Requirements 
(Level 4) 
Letter X is used to represent the sub-functions of A3.2, covering Sense Stored 
Information (A3.2.1), Transmitted Information (A3.2.2) and In Use Information (A3.2.3). 
Req. 3.2.X.3.1 Write/Record Sensor Result (A3.2.X.3) shall receive sensed target 
data from Sense Environment for Desired Target (A3.2.X.2). 
Req. 3.2.X.3.2 Write/Record Sensor Result (A3.2.X.3) shall receive configuration 
file from C2 (A1). 
Req. 3.2.X.3.3 Write/Record Sensor Result (A3.2.X.3) shall adhere to parameter 
setting constraint from Receive & Configure Files/Alerts (A3.1). 
Req. 3.2.X.3.4 Write/Record Sensor Result (A3.2.X.3) shall adhere to 
infrastructure constraint from External Infrastructures (B4). 
Req. 3.2.X.3.5 Write/Record Sensor Result (A3.2.X.3) shall adhere to 
infrastructure constraint from Smart Cloud SoS (B2). 
Req. 3.2.X.3.6 Write/Record Sensor Result (A3.2.X.3) shall output sensor result to 
Transmit Sensor Data (A3.2.X.4). 
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Req. 3.2.X.3.7 Write/Record Sensor Result (A3.2.X.3) shall provide the function 
to write and record sensor result for sense data information function of IASA. 
14. Transmit Sensor Data (A3.2.X.4) Functional Requirements (Level 4) 
Letter X is used to represent the sub-functions of A3.2, covering Sense Stored 
Information (A3.2.1), Transmitted Information (A3.2.2), and In Use Information 
(A3.2.3). 
Req. 3.2.X.4.1 Transmit Sensor Data (A3.2.X.4) shall receive sensor result from 
Write/Record Sensor Result (A3.2.X.3). 
Req. 3.2.X.4.2 Transmit Sensor Data (A3.2.X.4) shall receive configuration file 
from C2 (A1). 
Req. 3.2.X.4.3 Transmit Sensor Data (A3.2.X.4) shall adhere to parameter setting 
constraint from Receive & Configure Files/Alerts (A3.1). 
Req. 3.2.X.4.4 Transmit Sensor Data (A3.2.X.4) shall adhere to infrastructure 
constraint from External Infrastructures (B4). 
Req. 3.2.X.4.5 Transmit Sensor Data (A3.2.X.4) shall adhere to infrastructure 
constraint from Smart Cloud SoS (B2). 
Req. 3.2.X.4.6 Transmit Sensor Data (A3.2.X.4) shall output sensor data to Detect 
(A3.3.1). 
Req. 3.2.X.4.7 Transmit Sensor Data (A3.2.X.4) shall provide the function to 
transmit sensor data for sense data information function of IASA. 
15. Detect (A3.3.1) Functional Requirements (Level 3) 
Req. 3.3.1.1 Detect (A3.3.1) shall receive feature matrix for Stored Data, Transit 
Data, and Data In Use from (A3.2). 
Req. 3.3.1.2 Detect (A3.3.1) shall receive configuration file from C2 (A1). 
Req. 3.3.1.3 Detect (A3.3.1) shall adhere to parameter setting constraint from 
Receive & Configure Files/Alerts (A3.1). 
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Req. 3.3.1.4 Detect (A3.3.1) shall adhere to infrastructure constraint from 
External Infrastructures (B4). 
Req. 3.3.1.5 Detect (A3.3.1) shall output detection outcome to Identify (A3.3.2). 
Req. 3.3.1.6 Detect (A3.3.1) shall provide the detection function for intelligence 
automatize framework for IASA. 
16. Identify (A3.3.2) Functional Requirements (Level 3) 
Req. 3.3.2.1 Identify (A3.3.2) shall receive detection outcome from Detect 
(A3.3.1). 
Req. 3.3.2.2 Identify (A3.3.2) shall receive configuration file from C2 (A1). 
Req. 3.3.2.3 Identify (A3.3.2) shall adhere to parameter setting constraint from 
Receive & Configure Files/Alerts (A3.1). 
Req. 3.3.2.4 Identify (A3.3.2) shall adhere to infrastructure constraint from 
External Infrastructures (B4). 
Req. 3.3.2.5 Identify (A3.3.2) shall output identification outcome to Predict 
(A3.3.3). 
Req. 3.3.2.6 Identify (A3.3.2) shall provide the identify function for intelligence 
automatize framework for IASA. 
17. Predict (A3.3.3) Functional Requirements (Level 3) 
Req. 3.3.3.1 Predict (A3.3.3) shall receive identification outcome from Identify 
(A3.3.2). 
Req. 3.3.3.2 Predict (A3.3.3) shall receive configuration file from C2 (A1). 
Req. 3.3.3.3 Predict (A3.3.3) shall adhere to parameter setting constraint from 
Receive & Configure Files/Alerts (A3.1). 
Req. 3.3.3.4 Predict (A3.3.3) shall adhere to infrastructure constraint from 
External Infrastructures (B4). 
Req. 3.3.3.5 Predict (A3.3.3) shall output predication outcome to React (A3.3.4). 
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Req. 3.3.3.6 Predict (A3.3.3) shall provide the prediction function for intelligence 
automatize framework for IASA. 
18. React (A3.3.4) Functional Requirements (Level 3) 
Req. 3.3.4.1 React (A3.3.4) shall receive predication outcome from Predict 
(A3.3.3). 
Req. 3.3.4.2 React (A3.3.4) shall receive configuration file from C2 (A1). 
Req. 3.3.4.3 React (A3.3.4) shall adhere to parameter setting constraint from 
Receive & Configure Files/Alerts (A3.1). 
Req. 3.3.4.4 React (A3.3.4) shall adhere to infrastructure constraint from External 
Infrastructures (B4). 
Req. 3.3.4.5 React (A3.3.4) shall output control signal to React with Alerts & 
Control Signal (A3.4). 
Req. 3.3.4.6 React (A3.3.4) shall provide the reaction function for intelligence 
automatize framework for IASA. 
19. Detect Stored/Transit/In Use Data (A3.3.1.X) Functional 
Requirements (Level 4) 
Letter X is used to represent the sub-functions of A3.3.1, covering Sense Stored 
Information (A3.3.1.1), Transmitted Information (A3.3.1.2), and In Use Information 
(A3.3.1.3). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.1 Detect Stored/Transit/In Use Data (A3.3.1.X) shall receive feature 
matrix for Stored/Transit/In Use Data from Sense Information Data Environment (A3.2). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.2 Detect Stored/Transit/In Use Data (A3.3.1.X) shall receive 
configuration file from C2 (A1). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.3 Detect Stored/Transit/In Use Data (A3.3.1.X) shall adhere to 
parameter setting constraint from Receive & Configure Files/Alerts (A3.1). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.4 Detect Stored/Transit/In Use Data (A3.3.1.X) shall adhere to 
infrastructure constraint from External Infrastructures (B4). 
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Req. 3.3.1.X.5 Detect Stored/Transit/In Use Data (A3.3.1.X) shall output 
detection outcome to Identify (A3.3.2). 
Req. 3.3.1.1.6 Detect Stored/Transit/In Use Data (A3.3.1.X) shall provide the 
detection function for stored data. 
20. Receive Detect Config File (A3.3.1.X.1) Functional Requirements 
(Level 5) 
Letter X is used to represent the sub-functions of A3.3.1, covering Sense Stored 
Information (A3.3.1.1), Transmitted Information (A3.3.1.2), and In Use Information 
(A3.3.1.3). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.1.1 Receive Detect Config File (A3.3.1.X.1) shall receive 
configuration file from C2 (A1). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.1.2 Receive Detect Config File (A3.3.1.X.1) shall adhere to 
parameter setting constrain from Receive & Configure Files/Alerts (A3.1). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.1.3 Receive Detect Config File (A3.3.1.X.1) shall adhere to 
infrastructure constrain from External Infrastructures (B4). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.1.4 Receive Detect Config File (A3.3.1.X.1) shall output 
configuration file to other functions of Detect Stored/Transit/In Use Data (A3.3.1.X). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.1.5 Receive Detect Config File (A3.3.1.X.1) shall provide the 
function to receive detect configuration file for detection function of IASA. 
21. Receive New Sensor Data for Desired Target (A3.3.1.X.2) Functional 
Requirements (Level 5) 
Letter X is used to represent the sub-functions of A3.3.1, covering Sense Stored 
Information (A3.3.1.1), Transmitted Information (A3.3.1.2), and In Use Information 
(A3.3.1.3). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.2.1 Receive New Sensor Data for Desired Target (A3.3.1.X.2) shall 
receive stored/transit/in use data from Sense Information Data Environment (A3.2). 
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Req. 3.3.1.X.2.2 Receive New Sensor Data for Desired Target (A3.3.1.X.2) shall 
adhere to configuration file constraint from Receive Detect Config File (A3.3.1.X.1). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.2.3 Receive New Sensor Data for Desired Target (A3.3.1.X.2) shall 
adhere to parameter setting constraint from Receive & Configure Files/Alerts (A3.1). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.2.4 Receive New Sensor Data for Desired Target (A3.3.1.X.2) shall 
adhere to infrastructure constraint from External Infrastructures (B4). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.2.5 Receive New Sensor Data for Desired Target (A3.3.1.X.2) shall 
output received sensor data to Detect Features for Desired Target (A3.3.1.X.3). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.2.6 Receive New Sensor Data for Desired Target (A3.3.1.X.2) shall 
provide the function to receive new sensor data for detection function of IASA. 
22. Detect Features for Desired Target (A3.3.1.X.3) Functional 
Requirements (Level 5) 
Letter X is used to represent the sub-functions of A3.3.1, covering Sense Stored 
Information (A3.3.1.1), Transmitted Information (A3.3.1.2), and In Use Information 
(A3.3.1.3). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.3.1 Detect Features for Desired Target (A3.3.1.X.3) shall receive 
sensor data from Receive New Sensor Data for Desired Target (A3.3.1.X.2). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.3.2 Detect Features for Desired Target (A3.3.1.X.3) shall adhere to 
configuration file constraint from Receive Detect Config File (A3.3.1.X.1). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.3.3 Detect Features for Desired Target (A3.3.1.X.3) shall adhere to 
parameter setting constraint from Receive & Configure Files/Alerts (A3.1). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.3.4 Detect Features for Desired Target (A3.3.1.X.3) shall adhere to 
infrastructure constraint from External Infrastructures (B4). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.3.5 Detect Features for Desired Target (A3.3.1.X.3) shall output 
detected features to Update Detect Feature Matrix for Desired Target (A3.3.1.X.4). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.3.6 Detect Features for Desired Target (A3.3.1.X.3) shall provide the 
function to detect features of targets for detection function of IASA. 
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23. Update Detect Feature Matrix for Desired Target (A3.3.1.X.4) 
Functional Requirements (Level 5) 
Letter X is used to represent the sub-functions of A3.3.1, covering Sense Stored 
Information (A3.3.1.1), Transmitted Information (A3.3.1.2), and In Use Information 
(A3.3.1.3). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.4.1 Update Detect Feature Matrix for Desired Target (A3.3.1.X.4) 
shall receive detect features from Detect Features for Desired Target (A3.3.1.X.3). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.4.2 Update Detect Feature Matrix for Desired Target (A3.3.1.X.4) 
shall adhere to configuration file constraint from Receive Detect Config File 
(A3.3.1.X.1). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.4.3 Update Detect Feature Matrix for Desired Target (A3.3.1.X.4) 
shall adhere to parameter setting constraint from Receive & Configure Files/Alerts 
(A3.1). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.4.4 Update Detect Feature Matrix for Desired Target (A3.3.1.X.4) 
shall adhere to infrastructure constraint from External Infrastructures (B4). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.4.5 Update Detect Feature Matrix for Desired Target (A3.3.1.X.4) 
shall output the updated feature matrix to Send Feature Matrix to Identify (A3.3.1.X.5). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.4.6 Update Detect Feature Matrix for Desired Target (A3.3.1.X.4) 
shall provide the function to update the feature matrix of targets for detection function of 
IASA. 
24. Send Feature Matrix to Identify (A3.3.1.X.5) Functional 
Requirements (Level 5) 
Letter X is used to represent the sub-functions of A3.3.1, covering Sense Stored 
Information (A3.3.1.1), Transmitted Information (A3.3.1.2), and In Use Information 
(A3.3.1.3). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.5.1 Send Feature Matrix to Identify (A3.3.1.X.5) shall receive the 
updated feature matrix from Update Detect Feature Matrix for Desired Target 
(A3.3.1.X.4). 
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Req. 3.3.1.X.5.2 Send Feature Matrix to Identify (A3.3.1.X.5) shall adhere to 
configuration file constraint from Receive Detect Config File (A3.3.1.X.1). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.5.3 Send Feature Matrix to Identify (A3.3.1.X.5) shall adhere to 
parameter setting constraint from Receive & Configure Files/Alerts (A3.1). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.5.4 Send Feature Matrix to Identify (A3.3.1.X.5) shall adhere to 
infrastructure constraint from External Infrastructures (B4). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.5.5 Send Feature Matrix to Identify (A3.3.1.X.5) shall output the 
detection outcome to Identify (A3.3.2). 
Req. 3.3.1.X.5.6 Send Feature Matrix to Identify (A3.3.1.X.5) shall provide the 
function to send the feature matrix of targets for detection function of IASA. 
25. Receive Detect Feature Matrix (A3.3.2.1) Functional Requirements 
(Level 4) 
Req. 3.3.2.1.1 Receive Detect Feature Matrix (A3.3.2.1) shall receive the 
detection outcome from Detect (A3.3.1). 
Req. 3.3.2.1.2 Receive Detect Feature Matrix (A3.3.2.2) shall adhere to 
infrastructure constraint from External Infrastructures (B4). 
Req. 3.3.2.1.3 Receive Detect Feature Matrix (A3.3.2.2) shall adhere to 
configuration file constraint from Receive Identify Config Files (A3.3.2.2). 
Req. 3.3.2.1.4 Receive Detect Feature Matrix (A3.3.2.2) shall output the received 
detection feature matrix to Search Detect Feature Matrix using Rules (A3.3.2.3). 
Req. 3.3.2.1.5 Receive Detect Feature Matrix (A3.3.2.2) shall provide the function 
to receive detection outcome for the identify function of IASA. 
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26. Receive Identify Config File (A3.3.2.2) Functional Requirements 
(Level 4) 
Req. 3.3.2.2.1 Receive Identify Config File (A3.3.2.2) shall receive learned rules 
from Identify Learner (A3.3.2.6). 
Req. 3.3.2.2.2 Receive Identify Config File (A3.3.2.2) shall receive configuration 
file from C2 (A1). 
Req. 3.3.2.2.3 Receive Identify Config File (A3.3.2.2) shall adhere to parameter 
setting constraint from Receive & Configure Files/Alerts (A3.1). 
Req. 3.3.2.2.4 Receive Identify Config File (A3.3.2.2) shall adhere to 
infrastructure constraint from External Infrastructures (B4). 
Req. 3.3.2.2.5 Receive Identify Config File (A3.3.2.2) shall output configuration 
file to identify sub-functions that handle feature matrix. 
Req. 3.3.2.2.6 Receive Identify Config File (A3.3.2.2) shall output identify rules 
to Search Detect Feature Matrix using Rules (A3.3.2.3). 
Req. 3.3.2.2.7 Receive Identify Config File (A3.3.2.2) shall provide the function 
to receive configuration files and output them to sub-function of identify for the identify 
function of IASA. 
27. Search Detect Feature Matrix using Rules (A3.3.2.3) Functional 
Requirements (Level 4) 
Req. 3.3.2.3.1 Search Detect Feature Matrix using Rules (A3.3.2.3) shall receive 
the detection outcome from Receive Detect Feature Matrix (A3.3.2.1). 
Req. 3.3.2.3.2 Search Detect Feature Matrix using Rules (A3.3.2.3) shall receive 
identify rules from Receive Intelligent State Rules (A3.3.2.2). 
Req. 3.3.2.3.3 Search Detect Feature Matrix using Rules (A3.3.2.3) shall adhere 
to configuration file constraint from Receive Identify Config Files (A3.3.2.2). 
Req. 3.3.2.3.4 Search Detect Feature Matrix using Rules (A3.3.2.3) shall adhere 
to infrastructure constraint from External Infrastructures (B4). 
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Req. 3.3.2.3.5 Search Detect Feature Matrix using Rules (A3.3.2.3) shall output 
the search outcome to Update Identify Feature Matrix (A3.3.2.4). 
Req. 3.3.2.3.6 Search Detect Feature Matrix using Rules (A3.3.2.3) shall provide 
the function to search the detect feature matrix using rules for the identify function of 
IASA. 
28. Update Identify Feature Matrix (A3.3.2.4) Functional Requirements 
(Level 4) 
Req. 3.3.2.4.1 Update Identify Feature Matrix (A3.3.2.4) shall receive search 
outcome from Search Detect Feature Matrix using Rules (A3.3.2.3). 
Req. 3.3.2.4.2 Update Identify Feature Matrix (A3.3.2.4) shall adhere to 
configuration file constraint from Receive Identify Config Files (A3.3.2.2). 
Req. 3.3.2.4.3 Update Identify Feature Matrix (A3.3.2.4) shall adhere to 
infrastructure constraint from External Infrastructures (B4). 
Req. 3.3.2.4.4 Update Identify Feature Matrix (A3.3.2.4) shall output the updated 
feature matrix to Send Feature Matrix to Predict (A3.3.2.5). 
Req. 3.3.2.4.5 Update Identify Feature Matrix (A3.3.2.4) shall provide the 
function to update the identify feature matrix for the identify function of IASA. 
29. Send Feature Matrix to Predict (A3.3.2.5) Functional Requirements 
(Level 4) 
Req. 3.3.2.5.1 Send Feature Matrix to Predict (A3.3.2.5) shall receive the updated 
identify feature matrix from Update Identify Feature Matrix (A3.3.2.4). 
Req. 3.3.2.5.2 Send Feature Matrix to Predict (A3.3.2.5) shall adhere to 
configuration file constraint from Receive Identify Config Files (A3.3.2.2). 
Req. 3.3.2.5.3 Send Feature Matrix to Predict (A3.3.2.5) shall adhere to 
infrastructure constraint from External Infrastructures (B4). 
Req. 3.3.2.5.4 Send Feature Matrix to Predict (A3.3.2.5) shall output the identify 
outcome to Predict (A3.3.3). 
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Req. 3.3.2.5.5 Send Feature Matrix to Predict (A3.3.2.5) shall provide the 
function to send the identify outcome for the identify function of IASA. 
30. Identify Learner (A3.3.2.6) Functional Requirements (Level 4) 
Req. 3.3.2.6.1 Identify Learner (A3.3.2.6) shall receive detection outcome from 
Detect (A3.3.1). 
Req. 3.3.2.6.2 Identify Learner (A3.3.2.6) shall adhere to parameter setting 
constraint from Receive & Configure Files/Alerts (A3.1). 
Req. 3.3.2.6.3 Identify Learner (A3.3.2.6) shall adhere to infrastructure constraint 
from External Infrastructures (B4). 
Req. 3.3.2.6.4 Identify Learner (A3.3.2.6) shall output learned rules to Receive 
Identify Config File (A3.3.2.2). 
Req. 3.3.2.6.5 Identify Learner (A3.3.2.6) shall provide the function to learn the 
identify rules for the identify function of IASA. 
H. PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE OF IASA SYSTEM 
Recall the overall proposed system from Chapter I consists of three subsystems 
and the main focus will be on IASA system (Figure 40). 
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Figure 40.  Focus on IASA in the cyber situational awareness system of systems 
of specified information in the cloud. 
The deployment location of the DIPR software depends on the constraints caused 
by two factors. These are the bandwidths of the external infrastructure and the SoS 
computing resources and required performance. The following diagrams do not show the 
interactions between the IASA software modules; this will be discussed in Section G. 
A smart cloud SoS with limited computing resources and high performance 
requirement will not want to handle the detection within its infrastructure; instead the 
sensor data are transferred across the network to the computer housing the DIPR software 
for analysis. This setup will free up valuable computing resources required by the smart 
cloud SoS to maintain its performance requirements; however, the network will be tasked 
to handle the transfer of the sensor data, and this will affect its available bandwidth. The 
physical architecture of such a setup is shown in Figure 41. 
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Figure 41.  Physical Architecture of IASA with “Detect” function retained with 
IASA. 
Network or computing equipment/resources that are highlighted in red are 
elements of the external systems interacting with IASA; these include the smart cloud 
(ISR and social media), firewall, and the hardware infrastructure supporting the system. 
Those elements highlighted in blue refer to the components of IASA which include the 
data sensor, the internal firewall, and DIPR software. Sensors for Data at Rest (stored 
data) are deployed within the locations where the targeted files are stored, such as within 
the main cloud or a mini cloud hard disk drive. Mini clouds are constantly updating their 
collected data (Data In Use) from social media, the Internet, and ISR; therefore, the in-
use data sensors will be deployed within the mini clouds to closely monitor the targeted 
files. Some data will be transmitted from the mini clouds to the main cloud for processing 
or storage through the enterprise network. Packet analyzers with transmitted data sensors 
will be connected to the network to monitor the packets’ delivery of the data. The DIPR 
analyzer will be running from the IASA system that is connected to the network; it will 
come with firewalls to prevent any unauthorized access to the IASA system from within 
the enterprise network. 
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SoS with limited bandwidth provided by the external infrastructure will require 
the detection software to be deployed at the Smart Cloud SoS. This setup will reduce the 
amount of filtered sensor data being transferred within the network to the computer that 
houses the DIPR analysis software, thereby freeing up valuable computing resources. 
With the detection done in the smart cloud infrastructure, only the feature matrix of the 
target data is transferred across the network to the computer housing the software for 
Identify, Predict, and React analysis. The physical architecture of such a setup is shown 
in Figure 42. The physical architecture of the system in this thesis will focus on assuming 
that the bandwidth of the network is limited and there are adequate computing resources 
in the smart cloud, as illustrated in Figure 42. 
 
Figure 42.  Physical Architecture of IASA with “Detect” function deployed at 
smart mini cloud SoS. 
Figure 43 shows the flows of the configuration files to the sub-system of IASA in 
the physical architecture after receiving them from the C2 system. The IASA manager 
through “Receive & configure files/alerts” will receive configuration files from the C2 
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system and will pass the relevant configuration setting to the sub-system of IASA. All 
components of IASA, sense data software, and DIPR software, will receive the 
configuration files and adjust to match the monitoring needs set by the operator. 
 
Figure 43.  IASA receiving configuration files from C2 and filtering down to 
sub-systems. 
Twitter JSON files and surveillance video files that have been collected from 
social media, the Internet, and cameras, respectively, are been processed and stored in the 
social media and ISR mini cloud. The main cloud will also maintain a library of data 
collected over a period of time. The stored data sensor monitors and reports the status of 
the saved files in the hard disk drive of the mini clouds and main cloud in the form of a 
text document. The Data In Use sensor will monitor files that are being processed in the 
memory of the mini cloud and will report the status in the form of a text document. Some 
of these data, in the form of an XML file, collected by the mini clouds will be transferred 
to the main cloud via the internal enterprise network. The transmitted data sensor 
deployed in the packet analyzer will monitor and report the status of the transit data in the 
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form of an XML file. The IASA detection software for different states of data will pick 
up these XML files for analysis (Figure 44). 
 
Figure 44.  Data sensor monitoring targets’ information. 
The IASA Detect software will create feature matrix for each individual 
monitored file in the form of an XML file. XML files created by the detection software 
deployed in the mini clouds, main cloud, and packet analyzer will deliver the XML files 
through the enterprise network to the Identify, Predict, and React (IPR) analyzer for 
Identify analysis (Figure 45).  
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Figure 45.  Detect processing sensor data and updating feature matrix. 
The IASA Identify software receives the feature matrix XML files and compares 
them against predetermined intelligent state rules and updates the feature matrix XML 
file with information regarding any changes in the state rules. The Predict software using 
the identity outcome, calculates the possibility of an event occurring and updates the 
feature matrix XML file. The React software analyzes the probability of the event and 
responds with the appropriate measures to the IASA manager. Configuration files, alerts, 
and control signals can be issued by the IASA manager through “React with Alerts & 
Control Signal” in the form of an XML file. The Keyhole Markup Language (KML) file 
will be used as an alert when the location of the occurrence is of significant interest to the 
operator (Figure 46). 
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Figure 46.  Identify, predict, and react software analyzing and reacting to the 
collected data. 
I. SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE 
The software architecture of the IASA system can be described in Figure 47 with 
the assumption that the smart cloud SoS consists of mainly social media mini clouds and 
ISR mini clouds with a central database, called the main cloud. In the diagram, the social 
media mini cloud is represented in blue and the ISR mini cloud in red.  
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Figure 47.  Software architecture of IASA 
The IASA manager consists of two software modules called the “Receive & 
Configure Files/Alerts” and “React with Alert & Control Signal.” The “Receive & 
Configure Files/Alerts” will first receive and verify the configuration settings from the 
command and control system. Once the settings are accepted, the configuration setting 
will be issued to the respective smart cyber detection sensor modules deployed for 
different states of data. For Data at Rest, the detect smart cyber sensor modules will be 
deployed to all mini clouds, which include social media and ISR mini clouds, and the 
main smart cloud. For Data in Transit, the packet analyzer software module, with its own 
smart cyber detector, will be analyzing the data flow between the mini clouds and main 
smart cloud. For Data in Use, the detect smart cyber sensor modules will be deployed to 
only the mini clouds, which include social media and ISR mini clouds. After detection by 
the smart cyber sensor modules, the detect outcome is collected and consolidated by the 
IPR analyzer software module. Within the IPR analyzer module, the IPR module will 
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analyze the detection outcome and output the DIPR result to the IASA manager. The 
“React with Alert & Control Signal” module will issue alerts and/or control signal to the 
CSAC2 and CADSA system. 
J. TRACEABILITY MATRIX OF FUNCTIONAL ALLOCATION 
The mapping of the physical architecture to the functions of the IASA system is 
shown in the traceability matrix (Table 2).  
 








































Receive & configure 
file/alerts, A3.1 ✔      
Sense information data 
environment, A3.2   




 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
React with alerts & 
control signal, A3.4      ✔ 
Table 2.   Traceability matrix of the IASA system. 
 
K. PROPOSED INTELLIGENCE AUTOMATION FEATURE MATRIX 
The DIPR feature matrix allows analytics assessment of the sensor inputs of raw 
data using software modules to increase data intelligence and automate reactions based 
on predetermined scenarios. It provides a quick timestamp of the targeted data status, 
providing users with cyber situation awareness of the information. The proposed XML 
schema of the feature matrix for the DIPR model is shown in Figure 48. 
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The XML schema contains five main tags which represent the DIPR model. The 
first tag contains information regarding the smart cyber sensor that is used for detection. 
The “detect” tag contains information regarding the status of the data of interest collected 
by the sensors deployed in the clouds. Sampling rates of sensors can be fixed or of a 
configurable time period predetermined by the operator and set in the policy files. In the 
event of a heightened security situation, the sampling rate can be increased automatically. 
During detection by the function “Detect (A3.3.1),” the sensors will output XML files to 
the function “Receive New Sensor Data for Desired Target (A3.3.1.X.2)” and function 
“Detect Features for Desired Target (A3.3.1.X.3)” will pick up the required information 
pertaining to the data of interest. Information, such as where the data is located and 
saved, and the data itself will be picked up. This information will be recorded and 
updated on the feature matrix pertaining to the data by the function “Update Detect 
Feature Matrix for Desired Target (A3.3.1.X.4).” The updated feature matrix will then be 
sent out by “Send Feature Matrix to Identify (A3.3.1.X.5).” 
The “identify” tag contains filtered information on the status of the data collected 
in the “detect” tag. It contains output of the function “Identify (A3.3.2).” Based on 
intelligent state rules, the state of the data will be recorded in the “identify” tag of the 
XML schema. Similar to detection, the feature matrix will first be received, searched, 
updated, and sent to the function “Predict (A3.3.3).” The “predict” tag contains the 
classifiers to recognize the behavior of the data, classifying it as normal, abnormal, or 
unclassified based on patterns. These behaviors will be used to predict the future state of 
the data under observation. The “predict” tag of the XML schema is updated by the 
function “Predict (A3.3.3). The “react” tag will provide an appropriate reaction to the 
change of the state of information, and this will serve as the control signal to be used by 
other systems in the SoS, such as to close certain ports or encrypt files or folders. The 
“react” tag is updated by the function “React (A3.3.4).” 
The “Detect” sampling rate can be the same as sensors output rate but variable, 
depending on the configuration file sent to it. The policy for record keeping (Data 
Retention Policy) in the XML file can be fixed (e.g., 1 hr.). Sampling rates can vary 
depending on monitoring needs (e.g., 1 sec. to 1 min.), and the last record in the XML 
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file which exceeds the time duration specified in the policy for record keeping will be 
overwritten with new data using a loop function (Figure 49). 
 
Figure 49.  “Detect” XML schema.   
The “destination information” tag in the XML schema contains information about 
the host of the data such as the IP address of the device, the media access control (MAC) 
address, and the hard disk serial number. This information enables the hardware, where 
the data of interest is stored, to be monitored. The “target information” tag tracks the 
location or file directory where the data of interest is saved. The “file information” tag 
provides the status of the data of interest, such as time it was created, accessed and 
modified, and who performed those actions, and the size of the data. Together with target 




<Sensor ID> RS2 </ Sensor ID> 
<Sensor Type> Data at Rest </Sensor Type> 





<IP web address> IP web address </IP web address> 
<MAC address> MAC address </MAC address> 
<HDD volume serial number> serial number </HDD volume serial number>   
</Destination Information> 
<Target Information> 
<Location> folder directory </Location> 
<Filename> file name </Filename> 
</Target Information> 
<File Information> 
<DTime> date & time </DTime> 
<File size> size </File size> 
<Created time> date & time </Created time> 
<Created owner> name </Created owner> 
<Last Accessed time> date & time </Last Accessed time> 
<Last Accessed user> name </Last Accessed user> 
<Last Modified time> date & time </Last Modified time> 




The “identify” tag (Figure 50) will only show the time when the sampling of the 
feature matrix shows a change in the state of the data. This process allows information to 
be intelligently filtered down to highlight the critical change in the state of the 
information and also to conserve computer resources, such as the size of the XML file. In 
each sampling tag, information regarding the state of data during sampling and the time 
the change of state was detected is recorded.  
 
Figure 50.  “Identify” XML schema 
L. PROPOSED INTELLIGENCE AUTOMATION CONFIGURATION FILE 
The thesis will only focus only on sense, detect, and identify functions of the 
IASA system and the proposed XML schema for their configuration files is discussed in 
the following paragraphs. 
1. Sensor Configuration File 
The sensor configuration file contains seven main tags (Figure 51). Information 
regarding the operator issuing the configuration setting will be tagged under 
“originator/requestor.” Information pertaining to the sensor and target can be found under 
the “sensor information,” “target destination information,” and target information” tags, 
respectively. This information allows traceability on who issues the setting, what type of 
data is being monitored, and the physical location where the target is found. The 
configuration to obtain the status of the target will be provided in the “file information” 
tag. The option to activate encryption in the event of heightened security is also provided 
<Identify> 
<ISample#> 1 
<Time> date & time </Time> 
<State> true </State> 
<Dtime> date & time </Dtime> 
</ISample#>  
<ISample#> n 
<Time> date & time </Time> 
<State> true </State> 




in the schema under the “encryption” tag. Finally, the location to output the sensor XML 
record is provided under the “output location” tag.  
 
Figure 51.  Sense configuration XML schema. 
<?xml version="1.0"?> 
<Sense configuration file> 
<Originator/Requestor> 
<C2 ID> C2 HQ </C2 ID> 
<User ID> User 1 </User ID> 
<C2time> date & time </C2time> 
</Originator/Requestor> 
<Sensor Information> 
<Sensor ID> RS2 </ Sensor ID> 
<Data Type> Data at Rest </Data Type> 
<Sensor> DIR </Sensor> 
<Sensor Location> ISR server 2 </Sensor Location> 
<Sensor Sampling Rate> 10sec </ Sensor Sampling Rate> 
</Sensor Information> 
<Target Destination Information> 
<TIP web address> IP web address </TIP web address> 
<TMAC address> MAC address </TMAC address> 
<THDD volume serial number> serial number </THDD volume serial number>   
</Target Destination Information> 
<Target Information> 
<TLocation> folder directory </Location> 
<TFilename> file name </Filename> 
</Target Information> 
<File Information> 
<DTime> Yes/No </DTime> 
<File size> Yes/No </File size> 
<Created time> Yes/No </Created time> 
<Created owner> Yes/No </Created owner> 
<Last Accessed time> Yes/No </Last Accessed time> 
<Last Accessed user> Yes/No </Last Accessed user> 
<Last Modified time> Yes/No </Last Modified time> 
<Last Modified user> Yes/No </Last Modified user> 
</File Information> 
<Encryption> 
<Encrypt Target> Yes/No </Encrypt Target> 
</ Encryption> 
<Output location> 
<OIP web address> IP web address </OIP web address> 
<OMAC address> MAC address </OMAC address> 
<OHDD volume serial number> serial number </OHDD volume serial number> 
<OLocation> folder directory </OLocation> 
<OFilename> file name </OFilename> 
</Output location> 
</Sense configuration file> 
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2. Detect Configuration File 
The detect configuration file contains five main tags (Figure 52). Information 
regarding the operator issuing the configuration setting is tagged under 
“originator/requestor.” Information about where the target can be found is provided under 
the “destination and target information” tag. This information allows traceability on who 
issues the setting and the physical location where the target is found. The configuration to 
set the detection parameter is provided under the “detect parameter” tag. The location of 
where to send the feature matrix after detection appears under the “output location” tag. 
 
Figure 52.  Detect configuration XML schema. 
<?xml version="1.0"?> 
<Detect configuration file> 
<Originator/Requestor> 
<C2 ID> C2 HQ </C2 ID> 
<User ID> User 1 </User ID> 
<C2time> date & time </C2time> 
</Originator/Requestor> 
<Destination Information> 
<IP web address> IP web address </IP web address> 
<MAC address> MAC address </MAC address> 
<HDD volume serial number> serial number </HDD volume serial number>   
</Destination Information> 
<Target Information> 
<Location> folder directory </Location> 
<Filename> file name </Filename> 
</Target Information> 
<Detect Parameter> 
<Detect Rate> 1sec </Detect Rate> 
<Sample Size> 10 </ Sample Size> 
<DTime> Yes/No </DTime> 
<File size> Yes/No </File size> 
<Created time> Yes/No </Created time> 
<Created owner> Yes/No </Created owner> 
<Last Accessed time> Yes/No </Last Accessed time> 
<Last Accessed user> Yes/No </Last Accessed user> 
<Last Modified time> Yes/No </Last Modified time> 
<Last Modified user> Yes/No </Last Modified user> 
</Detect Parameter> 
<Output location> 
<OIP web address> IP web address </OIP web address> 
<OMAC address> MAC address </OMAC address> 
<OLocation> folder directory </OLocation> 
</Output location> 
</Detect configuration file> 
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3. Identify Configuration File 
The identify configuration file contains four main tags (Figure 53). Information 
regarding the operator issuing the configuration setting will be tagged under 
“originator/requestor.” Information pertaining to the location where the target can be 
found is provided under the “target information” tag. This information allows traceability 
on who issues the setting and the location where the target is found. The configuration to 
set the identification sampling rate will be provided in the “identify parameter” tag. 
Finally, the location of where to output the feature matrix after identification is provided 
under the “output location” tag. 
 
Figure 53.  Identify configuration XML schema. 
  
<?xml version="1.0"?> 
<Identify configuration file> 
<Originator/Requestor> 
<C2 ID> C2 HQ </C2 ID> 
<User ID> User 1 </User ID> 
<C2time> date & time </C2time> 
</Originator/Requestor> 
<Target Information> 
<Location> folder directory </Location> 
<Filename> file name </Filename> 
</Target Information> 
<Identify Parameter> 
<Identify Rate> 10sec </Identify Rate> 
< Sample Size> 10 </ Sample Size> 
<Rule> Yes/No </Rule> 
</Identify Parameter> 
<Output location> 
<OIP web address> IP web address </OIP web address> 
<OMAC address> MAC address </OMAC address> 
<OLocation> folder directory </OLocation> 
</Output location> 
</Identify configuration file> 
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IV. PROOF OF CONCEPT OF THE SYSTEM 
A. SCOPE AND EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
For scoping purposes, this proof of concept is scoped to monitor one specific 
feature matrix produced by the Detect software of IASA, which has filtered the data 
status of a target of interest (data at rest/stored data). In this case, the target of interest 
contains information (a tweet of a picture) that is collected from a social media mini 
cloud that is using the Windows operating system. The proof of concept will be using the 
Identify software of the DIPR model to analyze the feature matrix produced by the Detect 
software. 
Our experiment assumes there is a smart cloud system of systems which has a 
social media mini cloud that senses social media. It also assumes users want to use the 
IASA system to monitor collected tweets of pictures in the social media mini cloud 
during an HA/DR operation, and to get alerted on possible loss of confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of the collected social media sensor data. An assumption is 
made that Detect has already filtered out the status of the monitored target of interest, and 
the target’s feature matrix is produced by Detect software and is available for identify 
software. 
The SoS in the experiment setup is assumed to underutilize the computing 
hardware resources and the detection module of the DIPR model is deployed within the 
smart cloud SoS. There will be four test cases as follows: 
• Normal operation 
• Loss of confidentiality 
• Loss of integrity 
• Loss of availability 
First, in the scenarios where the system is running normally, there is no loss of 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the collected social media sensor data. The 
second test case involves the loss of confidentiality of the collected social media sensor 
data where there is an unauthorized access of the data. The third test case involves the 
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loss of integrity of the collected social media sensor data where there is an unauthorized 
modification of the data. The last test case involves the loss of availability of the 
collected social media sensor data where there is an unauthorized deletion of the data. 
Figure 54 provides the schematic diagram of the proof-of-concept experimental setup. 
 
Figure 54.  Schematic diagram of the proof-of-concept experimental setup. 
The experimental setup involves a computer representing the social media mini 
cloud and laptop housing the Detect and Identify software of the IASA. Social media 
files in the form of Twitter JSON files are collected and stored within the mini cloud hard 
drive; some of the Twitter files contains pictures in the form of JPEG files. The cyber 
sensor used by IASA will monitor the status of the JPEG files for confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability. The status of the JPEG files is transmitted using wireless 
Internet protocols to the laptop. The JPEG documents are received by the sensor data 
receiver and pushed to the Detect software for analysis. After analysis of the received text 
documents by the Detect software, the output in the form of the feature matrix or XML 
files, is pushed to the Identify software for comparison against intelligent state rules. The 
feature matrix is further updated by the Identify software to reflect any change in state. 
The proof of concept will cover the portion whereby the Identify software receives the 
feature matrix from the Detect software and updates it against intelligent state rules, as 
highlighted in red in Figure 54. 
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B. SOFTWARE PSEUDO CODE 
The Identify software reads the feature matrix XML files produced by the Detect 
software of the IASA system and outputs the Identify feature matrix XML file. The 
feature matrix XML file produced by the Detect software is used for the four 
experimental scenarios discussed in the following section. The Identify MATLAB codes 
are also discussed. 
1. Test Cases Detect Feature Matrix 
a. Normal Operation 
Figure 55 shows the XML file from the detection software, which is a snapshot 
showing the information collected from the target. Due to the length of the XML file, 
only the information from the first detection sample is shown. The full detection XML 
file can be found in Appendix A.  
 
Figure 55.  XML file from the detection software for a normal case. 
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b. Loss of Confidentiality 
The detection feature matrix was modified to reflect the loss of confidentiality in 
the collected data. Loss of confidentiality results when information is accessed by 
unauthorized users. The changes (highlighted in Red) in the collected data of the 
detection feature matrix are shown in Figure 56. The Detect XML file has the fields “last 
accessed time” and “last accessed user” changed to reflect the case of loss of 
confidentiality. 
 
Figure 56.  XML file from the detection software for loss of confidentiality. 
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c. Loss of Integrity 
The detection feature matrix was modified to reflect the loss of integrity in the 
collected data. Loss of integrity refers to the trustworthiness of the data and whether it 
has been tampered with or corrupted by unauthorized users. For a file to be modified it 
has to be accessed first; therefore, any unauthorized modification to the data is considered 
both loss of confidentiality and loss of integrity. The changes (highlighted in red) in the 
collected data of the detection feature matrix are shown in Figure 57. The Detect XML 
file has the fields “file size,” “last accessed time,” and “last accessed user,” and “last 
modified time” and “last modified user” changed to reflect the case of loss of integrity. 
 
 
Figure 57.  XML file from the detection software for loss of integrity. 
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d. Loss of Availability 
The detection feature matrix was modified to reflect the loss of availability in the 
collected data. Loss of availability refers to the inability of the user to access the data 
when required; the file has been renamed or removed from the monitored location. The 
changes (highlighted in red) in the collected data of the detection feature matrix are 
shown in Figure 58. The Detect XML file has the all the fields reported NIL to reflect the 
case of a missing file. 
 
Figure 58.  XML file from the detection software for loss of availability. 
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2. Identify MATLAB Coding 
The Identify software is made up of two MATLAB codes. The first is the 
component to sieve and filter out the status of the target file using the information 
collected from the Detect software, in the form of the detect feature matrix XML file. The 
second portion of the Identify software writes the identify status of the monitored target 
file into the identify feature matrix XML file. These two MATLAB codes are discussed 
in the following section. 
a. Identify 
The Identify code makes use of Wouter Falkena’s xml2struct function to read and 
extract the data from the detect feature matrix XML file. The information is then assigned 
individually as a variable in MATLAB (Figure 59). After assigning the variable in 
MATLAB, the data are compared for any discrepancy between the sampled detection 
time, such as changes in file size or timestamp and user access. The timestamp function 
from Eddie is used to create the identify time variable in MATLAB; this will be 
subsequently used to reflect the time identification software was run in the identify 
feature matrix XML file. A snapshot of the code is shown in Figure 60 (Eddie 2012). The 
full Identify MATLAB code can be found in Appendix B.  
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Figure 59.  MATLAB coding for Identify, extracting data from XML and 
assigning variables to the data. 
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Figure 60.  MATLAB coding for Identify, comparing the data extracted from 
detect XML. 
b. Identify XML Write 
The Identify XML Write code makes use of the MATLAB XML write function to 
create the identify feature matrix XML file. The status of the target file is input as a sub-
tag within the Identify XML. A snapshot of the code is shown in Figure 61, and the 
complete MATLAB coding can be found in Appendix C.  
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Figure 61.  MATLAB coding for Identify XML Write.   
C. RESULTS 
The results from the Identify module for the four test cases are discussed in this 
section. 
1. Normal Operation 
In a normal monitoring situation, the target file after creation should not be 
accessed or modified by any user other than the file creator. If it has, this can be 
determined by examining the timestamp of the monitored file, along with the created, 
accessed, and modified time. In addition, there should not be another user who has 
accessed or modified the file besides the creator. The file size of the target should be 
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consistently the same size throughout the monitored period. The identify feature matrix 
under a normal monitoring situation is shown in Figure 62. The identify feature matrix 
provides the status of the target file by examining the detection sampling results and 
comparing the information for any changes in file size, timestamp, and user. 
 
Figure 62.  XML output from Identify module for normal case. 
2. Loss of Confidentiality 
The confidentiality of a file can be assessed by examining the status of the file’s 
last accessed time and last accessed user. A difference between the detection samples is 
an indication of unauthorized access to the monitored file. Figure 63 shows the output of 
the Identify software identifying the difference in the last accessed time and user of the 
file.  
 
Figure 63.  XML output from Identify module for loss of confidentiality case. 
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3. Loss of Integrity 
The integrity of a file can be assessed by examining the status of the file’s last 
modified time and last modified user. A difference between the detection samples is an 
indication of an unauthorized modification to the monitored file. As previously 
explained, a file has to be accessed in order to be modified; therefore, the last accessed 
time and user will also be changed. Figure 64 shows the output of the Identify software 
identifying the difference in the file size, last accessed time and user, and last modified 
time and user of the file. 
 
Figure 64.  XML output from Identify module for loss of integrity case. 
4. Loss of Availability 
The availability of a file can be assessed by examining any status of the file. A 
missing file will not be detected by the Detect software; therefore, the missing status is 
recorded in the detect feature matrix XML file. Figure 65 shows the output of the Identify 
software identifying the difference in all fields as the file was no longer detected, 
therefore, recording a NIL return. 
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Figure 65.  XML output from Identify module for loss of availability case. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND AREAS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
Possible improvements for the proof of concept, suggestions for future work 
which would create a more robust system, and final conclusions on the success of the 
overall system are covered in this chapter.  
A. CONCLUSIONS 
1. IASA System 
The proposed IASA system proves to be able to ensure automated information 
assurance for cyber situational awareness of information with the assurance of data 
confidentially, integrity and availability through the use of an intelligence automation 
system. The successful development and deployment, with the CSAC2 and CADSA 
system, in the cloud environment will provide real-time assessment of any cyber system 
supporting military operations, automating the handling of big data and filtering the 
necessary alerts for the operators. Thereby it ensures essential data that are collected are 
not tampered with, resulting in the loss of information confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability. 
2. Proof of Concept of Identify DIPR Model 
The proof of concept successfully implemented the identify DIPR model for the 
IASA system. Using MATLAB software to read the detect feature matrix XML file, the 
code was able to extract the required information of the data at rest file, and output the 
status of the target to an identify feature matrix XML file. The identify coding was put 
through four scenarios whereby the file confidentiality, integrity, and availability was 
affected, and the code was able to successfully pick up the changes in status. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE PROOF OF CONCEPT 
After the proof of concept was completed and tested, the author uncovered areas 
where improvement can be made, which will result in a superior product. While the 
current proof of concept meets the intended objectives to demonstrate the abilities of the 
identify DIPR model, there are specific areas that will make the process better. 
1. Completeness 
If the proof of concept was able to include the detection, prediction, and reaction 
phase of the DIPR model, it would provide a better view of the IASA system and 
completeness from the detection of file source to the reaction due to changes in the 
predetermined intelligent state rules. The proof of concept should as far as possible 
emulate the actual deployment of the IASA system in the enterprise network. The Detect 
software should be collecting data on the mini cloud host and transmitting the feature 
matrixes to the IASA system for analysis over a LAN or wireless network; this setup 
would expose or highlight any possible issues when transmitting over a live network. 
2. Refining the Software Coding 
The identify feature matrix used in the proof-of-concept experimental setup wrote 
its identify result as a new XML file. Ideally, it would be better for a single feature matrix 
to be constantly updated by the DIPR software. This feature matrix will always be tagged 
to the monitored target, therefore, allowing better traceability and resources management. 
This can be done with more complex MATLAB coding to the identify XML write 
module of the identify software. 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Future work to develop and expand the architecture of the proposed system is 
discussed in this section. The usage of other file characteristics such as monitoring 
candidates, evaluating the effectiveness of monitoring other state of data, and refining the 
DIPR model is discussed. 
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1. Other File Characteristics as Monitoring Candidates  
In the proof-of-concept test, only the data state of data at rest has been examined, 
in which the file characteristics such as timestamps, user, and file size are used as 
monitoring candidates. Other file characteristics, such as in-depth analysis of the file 
source codes or binary data, can be employed but this will require complex programming 
in the Identify software and takes up more computing resources. 
The monitoring candidates can be further expanded with the inclusion of other 
data states, such as data in use and data in transit; each state requires a unique 
methodology of analyzing and monitoring the data, therefore ensuring information 
assurance is upheld in the system. 
2. Effectiveness of Monitoring Data in Transit and in Use 
Monitoring of data in transit poses a different set of monitoring candidates, 
sensors, and deployment method. An additional set of computing resources has to be 
setup to analyze data movement across the network. One method is the use of packet 
analyzer software to determine the data transmitted retains its confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability. 
Data in use is the most difficult state of data to monitor; the data can be constantly 
in use by users, and sensors have to be able to determine which changes are authorized 
and which are not. Deployment of numerous sensors with high sampling rates can bog 
down the host’s computing system, eating up valuable computing resources needed. 
Development of sensors for data in use can be further analyzed and studied. 
3. Expanding and Integrating with the Proposed CSAC2 and CADSA 
System 
Additional research and experimental testing is required to validate the trio 
combination setup and concept of CSAC2, CADSA, and IASA system within an 
enterprise network. The interfaces and interactions between these three systems need to 
be further standardized to ensure commands and alerts are understood between these 
systems; a common language, such as the usage of XML, can be explored to achieve this. 
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The complexity of these systems will surely create opportunities for further research into 
areas such as software development, communication protocol, standardization of file 
structure, self-protection against external and internal cyber attack, and human system 
interfaces. The effectiveness of the synergy and information sharing among the trio 
systems can also be further explored. 
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APPENDIX A. DETECT FEATURE MATRIX  
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<Detect version="1.0"> 
 <Sensor> 
  <Sensor_Information> 
   <Sensor_ID>RS2</Sensor_ID> 
   <Sensor_Type>Data_at_Rest</Sensor_Type> 
   <Sensor_Location>ISR_server_2</Sensor_Location> 
  </Sensor_Information> 
 </Sensor> 
 <Dsample1> 
  <Destination_Information> 
   <TIP_web_address>172.16.254.1</TIP_web_address> 
   <TMAC_address>1C-2B-A3-A2-2C-D1</TMAC_address> 
   <THDD_volume_serial_number>14E3-
32CF</THDD_volume_serial_number>   
  </Destination_Information> 
  <Target_Information> 
   <TLocation>C:\Camera1\Image</TLocation> 
   <TFilename>Image18022014073000.jpg</TFilename> 
  </Target_Information> 
  <File_Information> 
   <DTime>18022014073000</DTime> 
   <File_size>1400</File_size> 
   <Created_time>18022014073000</Created_time> 
   <Created_owner>Camera3</Created_owner> 
  
 <Last_Accessed_time>18022014073000</Last_Accessed_time> 
   <Last_Accessed_user>Camera3</Last_Accessed_user> 
  
 <Last_Modified_time>18022014073000</Last_Modified_time> 
   <Last_Modified_user>Camera3</Last_Modified_user> 
  </File_Information> 
 </Dsample1> 
 <Dsample2> 
  <Destination_Information> 
   <TIP_web_address>172.16.254.1</TIP_web_address> 
   <TMAC_address>1C-2B-A3-A2-2C-D1</TMAC_address> 
   <THDD_volume_serial_number>14E3-
32CF</THDD_volume_serial_number>   
  </Destination_Information> 
  <Target_Information> 
   <TLocation>C:\Camera1\Image</TLocation> 
   <TFilename>Image18022014073000.jpg</TFilename> 
  </Target_Information> 
  <File_Information> 
   <DTime>18022014073010</DTime> 
   <File_size>1400</File_size> 
   <Created_time>18022014073000</Created_time> 




   <Last_Accessed_user>Camera3</Last_Accessed_user> 
  
 <Last_Modified_time>18022014073000</Last_Modified_time> 
   <Last_Modified_user>Camera3</Last_Modified_user> 
  </File_Information> 
 </Dsample2> 
 <Dsample3> 
  <Destination_Information> 
   <TIP_web_address>172.16.254.1</TIP_web_address> 
   <TMAC_address>1C-2B-A3-A2-2C-D1</TMAC_address> 
   <THDD_volume_serial_number>14E3-
32CF</THDD_volume_serial_number>   
  </Destination_Information> 
  <Target_Information> 
   <TLocation>C:\Camera1\Image</TLocation> 
   <TFilename>Image18022014073000.jpg</TFilename> 
  </Target_Information> 
  <File_Information> 
   <DTime>18022014073020</DTime> 
   <File_size>1400</File_size> 
   <Created_time>18022014073000</Created_time> 
   <Created_owner>Camera3</Created_owner> 
  
 <Last_Accessed_time>18022014073000</Last_Accessed_time> 
   <Last_Accessed_user>Camera3</Last_Accessed_user> 
  
 <Last_Modified_time>18022014073000</Last_Modified_time> 
   <Last_Modified_user>Camera3</Last_Modified_user> 
  </File_Information> 
 </Dsample3> 
 <Dsample4> 
  <Destination_Information> 
   <TIP_web_address>172.16.254.1</TIP_web_address> 
   <TMAC_address>1C-2B-A3-A2-2C-D1</TMAC_address> 
   <THDD_volume_serial_number>14E3-
32CF</THDD_volume_serial_number>   
  </Destination_Information> 
  <Target_Information> 
   <TLocation>C:\Camera1\Image</TLocation> 
   <TFilename>Image18022014073000.jpg</TFilename> 
  </Target_Information> 
  <File_Information> 
   <DTime>18022014073030</DTime> 
   <File_size>1400</File_size> 
   <Created_time>18022014073000</Created_time> 
   <Created_owner>Camera3</Created_owner> 
  
 <Last_Accessed_time>18022014073000</Last_Accessed_time> 
   <Last_Accessed_user>Camera3</Last_Accessed_user> 
  
 <Last_Modified_time>18022014073000</Last_Modified_time> 
   <Last_Modified_user>Camera3</Last_Modified_user> 




  <Destination_Information> 
   <TIP_web_address>172.16.254.1</TIP_web_address> 
   <TMAC_address>1C-2B-A3-A2-2C-D1</TMAC_address> 
   <THDD_volume_serial_number>14E3-
32CF</THDD_volume_serial_number>   
  </Destination_Information> 
  <Target_Information> 
   <TLocation>C:\Camera1\Image</TLocation> 
   <TFilename>Image18022014073000.jpg</TFilename> 
  </Target_Information> 
  <File_Information> 
   <DTime>18022014073040</DTime> 
   <File_size>1400</File_size> 
   <Created_time>18022014073000</Created_time> 
   <Created_owner>Camera3</Created_owner> 
  
 <Last_Accessed_time>18022014073000</Last_Accessed_time> 
   <Last_Accessed_user>Camera3</Last_Accessed_user> 
  
 <Last_Modified_time>18022014073000</Last_Modified_time> 
   <Last_Modified_user>Camera3</Last_Modified_user> 
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APPENDIX B. IDENTIFY DIPR MODEL MATLAB CODE 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Identify - DIPR Model 
% 
% Edmund Teo 
% Version 1.0 
% created: 20 Feb 2014 
% last mod: Nil 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
%link to feature matrix created by detect 
FileInfo = xml2struct('D:\Test\Image18022014073000-FM.xml'); 
  
%extracting information on the file for sampling number 1 














%extracting information on the file for sampling number 2 














%extracting information on the file for sampling number 3 















%extracting information on the file for sampling number 4 














%extracting information on the file for sampling number 5 














% check the sensor data value on the file (FILE SIZE) 
DFS21 = strcmp(Filesize2,Filesize1); 
DFS32 = strcmp(Filesize3,Filesize2); 
DFS43 = strcmp(Filesize4,Filesize3); 
DFS54 = strcmp(Filesize5,Filesize4); 
% detect different in Createtime. (1 identical, 0 diff) 
if DFS21 == 1 % DFS21=1, no diff between filesize1&2, move on to check 
DFS32 
    if DFS32 == 1 % DFS32=1, no diff between filesize2&3, move on to 
check DFS43 
        if DFS43 == 1 % DFS43=1, no diff between filesize3&4, move on 
to check DFS54 
            if DFS54 == 1 % DFS54=1, no diff between filesize4&5, 
report final status 
                FSStatus = 'No change in file size'; 
            else FSStatus = 'Change in file size'; 
            end 
        else FSStatus = 'Change in file size'; 
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        end 
    else FSStatus = 'Change in file size'; 
    end 
else FSStatus = 'Change in file size'; 
end 
  
% check the sensor data value on the file (CREATE TIME) 
DCT21 = strcmp(Createtime2,Createtime1); 
DCT32 = strcmp(Createtime3,Createtime2); 
DCT43 = strcmp(Createtime4,Createtime3); 
DCT54 = strcmp(Createtime5,Createtime4); 
% detect different in Createtime. (1 identical, 0 diff) 
if DCT21 == 1 % DCT21=1, no diff between createtime1&2, move on to 
check DCT32 
    if DCT32 == 1 % DCT32=1, no diff between createtime2&3, move on to 
check DCT43 
        if DCT43 == 1 % DCT43=1, no diff between createtime3&4, move on 
to check DCT54 
            if DCT54 == 1 % DCT54=1, no diff between createtime4&5, 
report final status 
                CTStatus = 'No change in created time'; 
            else CTStatus = 'Change in created time'; 
            end 
        else CTStatus = 'Change in created time'; 
        end 
    else CTStatus = 'Change in created time'; 
    end 
else CTStatus = 'Change in created time'; 
end 
  
% check the sensor data value on the file (CREATE USER) 
DCU21 = strcmp(Createuser2,Createuser1); 
DCU32 = strcmp(Createuser3,Createuser2); 
DCU43 = strcmp(Createuser4,Createuser3); 
DCU54 = strcmp(Createuser5,Createuser4); 
% detect different in Createuser. (1 identical, 0 diff) 
if DCU21 == 1 % DCU21=1, no diff between createuser1&2, move on to 
check DCU32 
    if DCU32 == 1 % DCU32=1, no diff between createuser2&3, move on to 
check DCU43 
        if DCU43 == 1 % DCU43=1, no diff between createuser3&4, move on 
to check DCU54 
            if DCU54 == 1 % DCU54=1, no diff between createuser4&5, 
report final status 
                CUStatus = 'No change in created user'; 
            else CUStatus = 'Change in created user'; 
            end 
        else CUStatus = 'Change in created user'; 
        end 
    else CUStatus = 'Change in created user'; 
    end 
else CUStatus = 'Change in created user'; 
end 
  
% check the sensor data value on the file (ACCESS TIME) 
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DAT21 = strcmp(Accesstime2,Accesstime1); 
DAT32 = strcmp(Accesstime3,Accesstime2); 
DAT43 = strcmp(Accesstime4,Accesstime3); 
DAT54 = strcmp(Accesstime5,Accesstime4); 
% detect different in Accesstime. (1 identical, 0 diff) 
if DAT21 == 1 % DAT21=1, no diff between Accesstime1&2, move on to 
check DAT32 
    if DAT32 == 1 % DAT32=1, no diff between Accesstime2&3, move on to 
check DAT43 
        if DAT43 == 1 % DAT43=1, no diff between Accesstime3&4, move on 
to check DAT54 
            if DAT54 == 1 % DAT54=1, no diff between Accesstime4&5, 
report final status 
                ATStatus = 'No change in accessed time'; 
            else ATStatus = 'Change in accessed time'; 
            end 
        else ATStatus = 'Change in accessed time'; 
        end 
    else ATStatus = 'Change in accessed time'; 
    end 
else ATStatus = 'Change in accessed time'; 
end 
  
% check the sensor data value on the file (ACCESS USER) 
DAU21 = strcmp(Accessuser2,Accessuser1); 
DAU32 = strcmp(Accessuser3,Accessuser2); 
DAU43 = strcmp(Accessuser4,Accessuser3); 
DAU54 = strcmp(Accessuser5,Accessuser4); 
% detect different in Accessuser. (1 identical, 0 diff) 
if DAU21 == 1 % DAU21=1, no diff between Accessuser1&2, move on to 
check DAU32 
    if DAU32 == 1 % DAU32=1, no diff between Accessuser2&3, move on to 
check DAU43 
        if DAU43 == 1 % DAU43=1, no diff between Accessuser3&4, move on 
to check DAU54 
            if DAU54 == 1 % DAU54=1, no diff between Accessuser4&5, 
report final status 
                AUStatus = 'No change in accessed user'; 
            else AUStatus = 'Change in accessed user'; 
            end 
        else AUStatus = 'Change in accessed user'; 
        end 
    else AUStatus = 'Change in accessed user'; 
    end 
else AUStatus = 'Change in accessed user'; 
end 
  
% check the sensor data value on the file (MODIFY TIME) 
DMT21 = strcmp(Modifytime2,Modifytime1); 
DMT32 = strcmp(Modifytime3,Modifytime2); 
DMT43 = strcmp(Modifytime4,Modifytime3); 
DMT54 = strcmp(Modifytime5,Modifytime4); 
% detect different in Modifytime. (1 identical, 0 diff) 
if DMT21 == 1 % DMT21=1, no diff between Modifytime1&2, move on to 
check DMT32 
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    if DMT32 == 1 % DMT32=1, no diff between Modifytime2&3, move on to 
check DMT43 
        if DMT43 == 1 % DMT43=1, no diff between Modifytime3&4, move on 
to check DMT54 
            if DMT54 == 1 % DMT54=1, no diff between Modifytime4&5, 
report final status 
                MTStatus = 'No change in modifyed time'; 
            else MTStatus = 'Change in modifyed time'; 
            end 
        else MTStatus = 'Change in modifyed time'; 
        end 
    else MTStatus = 'Change in modifyed time'; 
    end 
else MTStatus = 'Change in modifyed time'; 
end 
  
% check the sensor data value on the file (MODIFY USER) 
DMU21 = strcmp(Modifyuser2,Modifyuser1); 
DMU32 = strcmp(Modifyuser3,Modifyuser2); 
DMU43 = strcmp(Modifyuser4,Modifyuser3); 
DMU54 = strcmp(Modifyuser5,Modifyuser4); 
% detect different in Modifyuser. (1 identical, 0 diff) 
if DMU21 == 1 % DMU21=1, no diff between Modifyuser1&2, move on to 
check DMU32 
    if DMU32 == 1 % DMU32=1, no diff between Modifyuser2&3, move on to 
check DMU43 
        if DMU43 == 1 % DMU43=1, no diff between Modifyuser3&4, move on 
to check DMU54 
            if DMU54 == 1 % DMU54=1, no diff between Modifyuser4&5, 
report final status 
                MUStatus = 'No change in modifyed user'; 
            else MUStatus = 'Change in modifyed user'; 
            end 
        else MUStatus = 'Change in modifyed user'; 
        end 
    else MUStatus = 'Change in modifyed user'; 
    end 
else MUStatus = 'Change in modifyed user'; 
end 
  
% check the sensor data value on the file (FILE SIZE) 
DFS21 = strcmp(Filesize2,Filesize1); 
DFS32 = strcmp(Filesize3,Filesize2); 
DFS43 = strcmp(Filesize4,Filesize3); 
DFS54 = strcmp(Filesize5,Filesize4); 
% detect different in Filesize. (1 identical, 0 diff) 
if DFS21 == 1 % DFS21=1, no diff between Filesize1&2, move on to check 
DFS32 
    if DFS32 == 1 % DFS32=1, no diff between Filesize2&3, move on to 
check DFS43 
        if DFS43 == 1 % DFS43=1, no diff between Filesize3&4, move on 
to check DFS54 
            if DFS54 == 1 % DFS54=1, no diff between Filesize4&5, 
report final status 
                FSStatus = 'No change in file size'; 
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            else FSStatus = 'Change in file size'; 
            end 
        else FSStatus = 'Change in file size'; 
        end 
    else FSStatus = 'Change in file size'; 
    end 
else FSStatus = 'Change in file size'; 
end 
  
%SUMMARY of state 













APPENDIX C. IDENTIFY WRITE XML MATLAB CODE  
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Identifywrite XML 
% 
% Edmund Teo 
% Version 1.0 
% created: 20 Feb 2014 







%Write/update the collected identify state into feature matrix 
docNode=com.mathworks.xml.XMLUtils.createDocument('Identify'); 
Identify=docNode.getDocumentElement; % Identify is the root node 
Identify.setAttribute('version','1.0'); 
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